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MESSING WITH MOTHER NATURE:
THE QUAGMIRE OF WETLAND
MITIGATION BANKING
By Theodore J. Griswold*

ince the 1970s, federal, state, and
local agencies have developed mitigation policies requiring developers,
including public works facilities, to compensate for unavoidable damage to wetlands and other sensitive environmental
habitats. Simply put, in exchange for permission to adversely affect the environment, the developer must promise to restore or enhance similar resources, either
in the same area or elsewhere. Unfortunately, these promises have often been
inadequately fulfilled.
Mitigation policies are costly and
time-consuming, and the requirements
often conflict among agencies. Developers complain that mitigation complicates
the regulatory process and introduces uncertainty into project planning. Environmental groups often view mitigation as
ineffective in protecting natural resources and as meager consolation in
their effort to preserve natural areas. In
general, current mitigation practices are
economically inefficient and often unsuccessful in reproducing the habitat
lost, leaving all parties dissatisfied.
The idea of "banking" mitigation efforts grew out of the frustration of development interests, environmental
groups, and regulatory agencies. Mitigation banking occurs where one or more
development interest agrees to restore or
create significant natural habitat prior to
impacting similar habitat. The developer
receives "mitigation credits" for the
amount of habitat successfully restored,
much like a deposit in a mitigation "bank
account." The developer is then allowed
to use the credits as compensation for
environmental impacts from future projects.
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In theory, mitigation banking provides the potential for more successful
mitigation projects, reduced mitigation
costs, a streamlined regulatory process
for development, greater regulatory predictability, and new business opportunities in restoration sciences.
The use of mitigation banking as a
wetland management and planning tool
is gaining notoriety, with considerable
support and opposition to the concept,
and is fast becoming one of the key natural resources issues of the 1990s. Once
understood, it is an issue which prompts
an immediate reaction. To developers,
mitigation banking is a mechanism
which satisfies environmental regulations and enables them to compensate for
habitat loss in an efficient, predictable
manner. To regulatory officials, it is an
undesirable necessity of permitting in a
densely populated, resource-depleted
state. To scientists, it is a premature leap
forward into an uncertain science of habitat restoration and creation. To planners,
it is a broadbrush method of incorporating regional environmental concerns into
the planning process. To conservationists, it represents a potential relaxation
of environmental standards and a license
to destroy an already scarce, valuable
resource.
This disagreement reveals a central
issue which must be addressed: Too little
is known about the biological and economic success of mitigation banking,
and this knowledge will improve only
through practice and experimentation.
This article introduces the reader to the
issues surrounding mitigation and mitigation banking, and suggests the incorporation of experimentation as a supple-
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ment to wetland enhancement requirements to encourage and accelerate the
likelihood of success as the concept
evolves.

PROBLEMS
PECULIAR TO CALIFORNIA

Over the past half-century, California
has been a leader in social, political, and
legal trends. Not all of these trends, however, are positive. California ranks among
the leaders in the destruction of wetland
resources, and wildlife habitats are becoming rapidly depleted in the face of
domestic and industrial development.
California's solutions to this destruction
have been suitably trendy, and include
the occasional use of mitigation banking
as an answer to the struggle between
enormous development pressures and the
desire to preserve the region's natural
biodiversity. Several peculiar California
resource conditions deserve ·brief mention to permit a better understanding of
why the mitigation banking debate has
advanced so quickly in California.
Coastal Population Concentration.
The impact of urban development on
coastal wetland resources cannot be
overstated: 64% of the state's population
lives in the coastal counties, and 76% of
these people Jive south of Ventura
County. 1 In southern California, twenty
million people Jive along 200 miles of
shoreline.2 These populations result in
inordinate pressures to develop the remaining wetland and watershed lands,3
with houses, marinas, and shopping centers replacing remnant wetlands. 4
Transportation corridors within the
coastal areas have resulted in direct and
indirect impacts to wetland resources. 5
The direct impacts of urbanization include roads and rail lines located on wetland fill. In southern California, the emblematic coastal drive has altered the hydrology of nearly every coastal wetland
by constricting the tidal openings to narrow bridge underpasses and inhibiting
the natural migration of the openings. As
a result, most southern California coastal
wetlands are closed to tidal flushing for
much of the year.
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Indirect impacts from urban areas
have been at least as devastating to the
California wetland resource. Intrusion of
domestic animals into wetland areas has
led to predation on wetland-dependent
birds and animals. 6 Moreover, the mere
presence of humans in a salt marsh has
been found to instigate a flight reflex in
some marsh birds from as far as 195 feet
away. 7 Other impacts are more subtle.
Coastal sand dunes once created a barrier
between many coastal wetland areas and
the ocean. Most of these dunes have
been developed for coastal housing. In
the few areas where the dunes remain,
foot traffic has killed much of the vegetation that once anchored the sand creating the dunes. Once denuded of vegetation, the sand is easily blown away or
washed into the ocean, making the dune
system gradually disappear. Eventually,
the dunes become reduced to the point
where storm surges can wash over them,
pushing sand into tidal channels of the
adjacent wetland. The constricted channels can lead to devastatinf effects on
the wildlife of the wetland.
Wetland Habitat Loss in California. Estimates of wetland habitat loss in
California vary considerably depending
on the scope of the estimate; however,
any way the numbers are presented, the
message is staggering. 9 Statewide, it is
estimated that only 10% of the wetland
acreage present in the mid- l 800s remains today. IO The largest loss of wetlands has occurred in the Central Valley
and Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta, where 95% of the four million
acres of historic marsh and swamplands
has been reclaimed for africulture since
the nineteenth century. 1 The Klamath
Basin has lost 60% of historic wetlands
to agricultural reclamation and federal
water projects. 12 In the San Francisco
Bay Area, about 75% of historic wetlands have been lost to port and harbor
development, urban expansion, industrial
development and military installations. 13
In southern California, over three-fourths
of the coastal wetland habitat has been
destroyed, with nearly all of the remaining habitat greatly disturbed. 14 In Los
Angeles and Orange counties, tidal wetlands have been reduced by 90%, and
are considered more "museum pieces"
than wildlife habitat. 15 In fact, the only
regions in the state which retain more
than half of their historic wetland acreage are the north and central coast areas,
where urban and agricultural pressures
are minimal. 16
The impact of the loss of wetland
habitat is reflected in the decline of the
plant and animal species which rely on
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it. At least 24 wetland-dependent animal
species and several more plant species
are currently listed as state or federal endangered species. 17 Many of the state's
coastal fisheries declined rapidly after
the turn of the century as intertidal and
wetland areas were lost. 18 One of the
best-documented declines has been the
reduction in waterfowl and shorebirds. 19
Once a wintering and breeding haven for
these migratory birds, California wetlands now represent an ecological bottleneck for waterfowl populations. 20
Ironically, the lack of wetlands in
California has compounded the mitigation problem by creating a shortage of
potential wetland restoration or creation
sites. In the San Francisco Bay Area
alone, one million dollars has accrued
from various projects which have triggered mitigation requirements, but there
is no place to implement them. 21 In
southern California, many coastal wetland areas are constrained in narrow valleys, restricting the ability to create
"new" wetland habitat. 22
Water Scarcity. The scarcity of
water and the escalating demand for it
have presented a myriad of problems for
wetland areas throughout the state. In
southern California, dams to create reservoirs for urban water supplies have altered the hydrology and sedimentation
patterns of most streams, leading to a
deficit in shoreline sand replenishment
and accelerated coastal erosion. 23 At the
same time, unregulated clearing and construction in watersheds has led to the deposit of excessive amounts of sediments
in downstream wetlands where hydrology is insufficient to carry them offshore.
As a result, wetlands become clogged
with fine sediments, reducing the ability
of the wetland to maintain tidal flushing.24
The uncertain nature of the California
water supply for wetland management
has led to indirect incentives for agricultural conversion in the Central Valley. 25
At the same time, increased demand for
water in the state has led to net exports
of streamflow from northern California,
depriving many wetland areas of adequate water.

MITIGATION:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

In laying the groundwork for understanding the mitigation banking debate,
it is necessary to understand that the controversy begins with widespread disagreement regarding the appropriate definition of the term "mitigation" itself in
law, regulation, and practice. 26 The myriad of definitions of the term that have

been adopted by the various parties involved in the mitigation debate make it
difficult to offer any precise definition of
"mitigation" as it relates to wetland policy. Much of the mitigation debate has
centered on this very question.
Historical Use of Mitigation. The
use of mitigation requirements in wildlife resource management dates back to
the 1950s, when "resource mitigation"
was used to compensate for the effects
of dams on anadromous fish populations
through the construction of hatcheries or
fish passages to lessen the impact of development on a specific population of
animals. 27 With the environmental
movement in the 1970s came an expansion of the mitigation concept to address
broader types of resource losses, and a
new management emphasis on habitat
preservation rather than single species
preservation. 28 This shift in emphasis
prompted calls for new kinds of mitigation, including the acquisition and preservation of natural habitat to compensate
for habitat lost to development, reductions in pollutants from existing sources
to compensate for new sources of pollution, and the creation, restoration, and
enhancement of sensitive habitat to replace lost habitat values. 29
Shortly thereafter, the federal Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act
(FWCA) 30 and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 31 provided
early statutory authority for mitigation
requirements related to federal projects
and federally-issued permits. 32 Additional authority was later provided by
several executive proclamations. 33 These
legislative and executive actions, however, amounted to little more than acknowledgements of mitigation requirements without providing guidance for
how and when they should be applied.
A Federal Regulatory Definition.
After a decade of misunderstanding and
regulatory confusion regarding the
meaning of the term "mitigation," the
President's Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) offered guidelines in
1978 which focused on five elements:
(a) avoiding the environmental impact altogether by not taking a certain
action or parts of an action;
(b) minimizing the impact by limiting
the degree or magnitude of the action
and its implementation;
(c) rectifying the impact by repairing,
rehabilitating, or restoring the affected
environment;
(d) reducing or eliminating the impact
over time by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the
action; and
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(e) compensating for the impact by
replacing or providing substitute resources or environments. 34
This language became the accepted
regulatory definition of "mitigation" and,
for the first time, regulatory agencies
could point to a single, concise set of
words that codified the "official" meaning of the term. Unfortunately, no interpretive guidance accompanied the definition regarding the proper application of
the five elements. Thus, the primary
issue in mitigation policy shifted from
the meaning of the term to the manner
in which it should be applied.
Other Key Terms in the Mitigation
Debate. Before discussing the issues surrounding the proper application of mitigation, it is worth noting that the inconsistent use of other terms by developers,
public agencies, states, and municipalities has compounded the confusion surrounding mitigation. In an effort to provide some order to the terminology applied to wetland mitigation, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
coordinated a 1989 nationwide census of
wetland scientists, regulators, and managers regarding the proper definitions of
key terms. 35 The following frequently
used terms deserve abbreviated definitions for a consistent understanding in
the discussion to follow. These terms
have been defined in different language
by other sources; however, the following
definitions represent the general consensus, according to the EPA survey. 36
• Restoration: returned from a disturbed or totally altered condition to a
previously existing, natural, or altered
condition by some action by man. Restoration refers to the return of a tj'fe of
habitat to a preexisting condition.
• Creation: the conversion of persistent non-wetland area into a wetland
through some activity of man. This definition presumes the site has not been a
wetland within recent times (I 00-200
years) and thus restoration is not occurring. There are two types of created wetlands: artificial and man-induced. Artificial wetlands require some continuous or
persistent activity of man (e.g., irrigation
or weeding) to exist. Man-induced wetlands generally result from a one-time
action of man and persist on their own. 38
Of the various types of compensatory
mitigation, this is the most technically
challen~ing and the most uncertain of
success. 9 Consequently, it is the least
desirable form of manipulative mitigation.
• Enhancement: the increase in one
or more values of all or a portion of an
existing wetland by man's activities,

often with an accompanying decline in
other wetland values. 40 Enhancement
and restoration are often confused. Enhancement is considered the intentional
alteration of an existing wetland to provide conditions which previously did not
exist and which, by consensus, increase
one or more values. 41
• Success: achieving established
goals. Success in wetlands restoration,
creation, and enhancement ideally requires that quantitative criteria be established prior to commencement of these
activities. It is important to note that a
project may not succeed in achieving its
goals, yet may still provide some other
values deemed acceptable upon evaluation. In such a case, the project may fail,
but habitat is nevertheless established. In
situations where poor or nonexistent
goal-setting occurred, functional equivalency may be determined by comparison
with a reference wetland, and success defined by this comparison. 42
• Onsite Mitigation: compensatory
mitigation which occurs adjacent to or in
the immediate vicinity of the impacted
habitat. Generally considered to be a part
of the same functioning ecosystem, and
considered preferable to offsite mitigation.43 Replacement wetlands should be
created or restored as near the original
wetland site as possible to ensure that the
benefits of the original wetland continue
to be enjoyed locally. 44
• Of/site Mitigation: compensatory
mitigation occurring outside the ecosystem sustaining the impacts of the proposed development. Considered less
preferable than onsite mitigation because
compensation is geographically removed
from impacts, leadin~ to a localized depletion of resources. 5
• In-kind Replacement: providing or
managing substitute resources to replace
functional values of the resources lost,
where such substitute resources are
physically and biologically the same or
closely approximate those lost. 46
• Out-of-kind Replacement: providing or managing substitute resources to
replace functional values of the resources lost, where such substitute resources are physically or biologically
different from those lost. 47 Out-of-kind
replacement is generally avoided because it fails to restore the habitat values
that were lost. 48
Avoidance or Compensation? As
various agencies attempted to implement
the mitigation concept outlined by the
CEQ in 1978, most failed to coordinate
these efforts among themselves. As a result, single projects often received very
different mitigation requirements from
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different agencies. 49 It became clear that
a unified policy was necessary to provide
consistency in the government's application of the concept; however, the resource
community was sharply divided on
which policy should be adopted.
Through the 197Os, the common application of "mitigation" meant both avoiding damage to sensitive areas and carrying out some form of compensation for
damage which has occurred. 50 This dual
usage of the term became the root of the
mitigation debate, as some agencies saw
impact avoidance as a prerequisite to
compensation, while others saw the use
of avoidance as discretionary.
The first federal attempt to produce a
uniform policy on mitigation application
came in 1981, when the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS) published its
FWS Mitigation Policy. 51 The FWS Mitigation Policy declared the elements in
the CEQ definition, 52 in the order listed,
as the desirable sequence of steps to be
used in the mitigation planning process,
and set guidelines for mitigation goals
based on resource categories. Simply
put, USFWS identified four resource categories, decreasing in importance, with
corresponding mitigation goals with decreasing levels of stringency. The level
of mitigation to be required corresponded with the value and scarcity of
the habitat at risk. 53 USFWS' adoption
of this policy of applying the mitigation
definition sequentially, with an emphasis
on the avoidance of impacts, has been
identified as the turning point in the mitigation debate. 54 The Policy emphasizes
that although "mitigation" is often defined in terms of habitat restoration, creation, or enhancement to compensate for
project-related impacts, such compensation is viewed as the least favored
method of mitigation. The heart of the
Policy is the avoidance of damage altogether, rather than an attempt to repair
damage after it occurs. 55 The FWS Mitigation Policy was eventually adopted by
EPA. 56
Some agencies-notably the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)-resisted the "sequential" application of the
mitigation definition, preferring instead
to base mitigation requirements on a balancing of the public interest in a given
project. 57 In 1985, the Corps explicitly
adopted the position that "mitigation"
(including compensation) should be considered throughout the permit process,
and refused to view it in a step-wise
fashion. 58 In balancing the public interest benefits of a project against its detriments, the Corps used "mitigation" to
tip the public interest balance so that a
3
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project might be found in the public interest.59 According to David Barrows,
fonnerly of the Office of the Chief of
Engineers in Washington, D.C., the factors used to mitigate projects in this way
include project adjustments relating to
fish and wildlife resources, water quality,
erosion control, navigation, historic
properties, and economics. 60 The Corps
viewed mitigation as a tool to allow the
authorization of a construction project. 61
The Corps' interpretation of federal
mitigation policy acquired heightened
importance because of its key role in reviewing dredge and fill permit applications under section 404 of the federal
Clean Water Act (CWA) and section 10
of the River and Harbors Act. 62 Both of
these Acts regulate activities limited to
aquatic or wetland habitats. Section 404
of the CWA prohibits the discharge of
any pollutants into the nation's waters
without a pennit. 63 Following considerable congressional debate regarding the
proper agency to oversee the permit program,64 a compromise enabled EPA and
the Corps to share custody of the program.65 It was decided that primary permitting authority under section 404
would be administered by the Corps, 66
with EPA maintaining statutory power to
veto an~ Corps permits erroneously
granted. 7 EPA was also required to produce specific guidelines ("404(b)(I)
guidelines") with the Corps for use in
Corps pennit application decisions, and
to help detennine the extent of section
404 jurisdiction. 68 The mitigation requirements for the permitting program
originate from these EPA guidelines, but
are initially administered by the Corps.
Unfortunately, the Corps and EPA have
rarely agreed on the interpretation of
these guidelines and have become the
fighting Siamese twins of wetlands regulation.
EPA incorporated the sequential application of the mitigation concept into
the 404(b)(I) guidelines when they were
promulgated in 1980. 69 As noted above,
the Corps disagreed with the guidelines'
emphasis on avoidance of impacts, preferring instead to sidestep the avoidance
issue and consider compensatory mitigation throughout the permit process.
While the Corps' approach pennitted applicants to demonstrate their willingness
to cooperate and contribute to wetland
value concerns, it is also presupposed
that a pennit would not be denied. This
latter factor was attractive to agency staff
members who were under pressure to
avoid lengthy delays and potential litigation because it eliminated the possibility
of a fifth amendment "takings" challenge
4

to the agency's actions, since the agency
would not outright deny the pennit. 70 At
a time when the emphasis of Corps personnel was on processing pennits and
not on protecting the resource, this shortcut method through the ~ennit process
was extremely attractive. 1 The danger
of this approach, according to EPA
sources, was that it violated the basic
definition of mitigation being used by
other agencies. 72 By accepting mitigation proposals for habitat enhancement
or replacement up front, mitigation became a sort of currency for the destruction of wetlands. 73
The Corps' policy, which was widely
supported by the development industry
and adopted by some state and local regulatory agencies, caused many people to
wrongly associate mitigation exclusively
with terms such as the creation, restoration, or enhancement of wetland habitat.74 This led to the tendency for many
involved in the business of mitigation to
begin debating the technical issues of individual proposals without first addressing the more important philosophical
issue of whether the impacts to the
resource were reasonable or justifiable in
the first place. 75
The conflicting mitigation policies of
EPA and the Corps met head on in
Bersani v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 76 which tested the EPA's veto
power under section 404 and the proper
application of the section 404(b)( I)
guidelines. 77 In Bersani, EPA vetoed the
Corps' issuance of a section 404 permit
on the basis of erroneous application of
the 404(b )(I) guidelines and of the federal mitigation policy. The basic premise
of the veto was that the 404(b )( 1) guidelines do not allow mitigation as a remedy
for destroying wetlands when practicable
alternatives exist. 78 The developer sued
to overturn the veto. The district court
and the Second Circuit upheld the veto,
noting that use of the 404(b )(I) guidelines in permit review is mandatory,
while the public interest review, which
the Corps used in approving the pennit,
is only discretionary. 79 The court also
endorsed EPA's influence in the section
404 program by interpreting the guidelines to "provide an incentive to avoid
choosing wetlands" for development. 80
EPA's policy against using mitigation to
offset the filling of existing wetlands resources was also accepted as reasonable
by the court. 81
Current Federal Mitigation Policy:
The EPA/Corps Mitigation MOA. The
primary benefit of Bersani was that it
forced the agencies to sit down and agree
to a unified policy on mitigation. On No-

vember 15, 1989, the Department of the
Army, USFWS, and EPA ended their
protracted dispute over mitigation by
signing a memorandum of agreement
(MOA) stating that mitigation alone may
not provide a basis for issuing a section
404 permit. 82 The MOA accepted EPA's
longstanding sequencing approach to
mitigation, permitting mitigation to be
considered only after a project meets
pennit criteria without the aid of mitigation. 83 Compensatory mitigation is no
longer allowed to reduce the environmental impacts in the evaluation of the
least dama~ing practicable alternatives to
a project. 4 The memorandum also
adopts other mitigation criteria which
were formerly only disputed policy, including an overall standard for mitigation as replacement of functional value,
consistent with a "no net loss policy. " 85
The "no net loss" policy has become
a favorite political catch phrase which
many politicians and agency administrators have used to characterize their views
as "pro-environment." These speakers
interpret the phrase simplistically to
mean that no wetland acreage will be
lost on a specific project, either on a
regionwide or nationwide basis. In other
words, for every acre of wetland impacted or lost, a new acre must be created or restored so that there is "no net
loss" of wetlands. However, this is not
the intent of EPA's "no net loss" policy.
The new memorandum of agreement
corrected misinterpretations of the policy
to require no net loss of functional wetland values. 86 The functional value of
one acre of restored or created wetland
is not equivalent to an acre of natural
habitat; thus, if the "no net loss" policy
is used on the basis of acreage, there
would necessarily be a net loss of wetland functional values.
The effective date of the MOA was
delayed twice by the White House in response to criticism from the Departments
of Energy and Transportation, the oil and
gas industry, and development interests
in Alaska. The final version of the memorandum-which contained substantive
revisions regarding Alaska-became effective on February 7, 1990. 87 These revisions-which allow for less than oneto-one functional replacement of wetlands filled in the state of Alaska-have
been criticized as precluding a realistic
national goal of "no net loss" of wetland
functional values, making the agreement
internally inconsistent. 88
To reiterate, the current Corps/EPA/
USFWS policy on mitigation explicitly
states that the applicant may propose
compensatory mitigation only as a last
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resort. The applicant must first avoid impacts to the wetland; second, it must
minimize those impacts, third, it must try
to repair or rehabilitate the habitat that
would be damaged. Therefore, it is essential to preface the forthcoming discussion of mitigation banking with the
acknowledgement that the realm of mitigation banking applies only to projects
resulting in unavoidable habitat loss. Before a project proponent reaches the
stage where mitigation banking may be
discussed, the first three steps of the mitigation policy must be carried out to
their fullest extent.
California Mitigation Policy. California wetlands protection law consists
of a patchwork of state and local laws,
ordinances, regulations, and policy statements that at times are redundant, and at
others leave regulatory gaps. 89 This fragmentation has left California without a
unified or predictable statewide mitigation policy. Compounding this problem
is the fact that the state has an abundance
of environmental statutes which require
some form of mitigation. 90 In the absence of a clear statewide policy, it may
be helpful to understand the mandates of
a few of the major agencies which influence mitigation practices in California.
Department of Fish and Game. The
primary role of the Department of Fish
and Game (DFG) is trustee for the welfare of the state's fish, wildlife, and plant
resources. 91 DFG has no direct permit or
regulatory authority over wetlands, but
does regulate construction activities
which may "divert, obstruct, or change
the natural flow or the bed, channel, or
bank of any river, stream, or lake designated by [DFG] .... " 92 DFG's role in wetlands regulation on private land is limited to reviewing projects and providin_g
advisory comments and information. 93
Permitting agencies must consult with
DFG as the "trustee agency" for natural
resources whenever a project impacts
fish and wildlife resources. 94 Additionally, DFG is authorized by the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act to provide
comments on federal projects impacting
California's natural resources, including
all section 404 permits. 95
DFG and the Fish and Game Commission96 have adopted a policy regarding protection of wetlands which reflects
an extremely optimistic view of man's
capability to create or restore functional
wetland habitats. 97 The policy's basic
tenet is that projects should not result in
a net loss of either wetland acreage or
wetland habitat value. 98 The policy also
states that "mitigation and compensation
of project impacts through acquisitions

and restoration has been the responsibility of project beneficiaries."99 DFG conveys this message through project review, analysis, and negotiations with
other resource agencies and private individuals using several "wetland impact
minimization techniques." IOO
Coastal Regulation. The most important state provision regarding coastal
wetlands and mitigation is the Coastal
Act of 1976. IOI The Coastal Act prohibits coastal development projects involving the diking, dredging, or filling of
wetlands unless they fit into one of eight
categories. 102 Ironically, several of these
categories have been major causes of
degradation of the coastal wetlands
resource. 103 The Coastal Act is primarily
administered by the California Coastal
Commission, which may require mitigation before ap~roving a coastal development project. 04 Coastal Commission
staff considers the Coastal Act "internally balanced"-that is, the statute already balances economic and development concerns with wildlife and environmental concerns. 105 As such, there is no
need to balance the Coastal Act provisions against economic concerns when
making permitting decisions.
The Coastal Commission also administers the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). 106 Pursuant to the
CZMA, the Commission implements the
California Coastal Management Program, which clarifies the state coastal resources policy, and allows for the delegation of the Commission's duties to
local governments upon apwoval of a
local coastal program (LCP). 07 Pursuant
to this program, the Coastal Commission
(or a certified local government) issues
coastal development permits for all projects and structural activities in the
coastal zone. 108
Before a coastal development permit
to dike, fill, or dredge wetlands is issued,
the Commission must find that there is
not a feasible, less damaging alternative,
that feasible mitigation measures have
been provided to minimize adverse environmental impacts, and that the functional capacity of wetland areas are
maintained or enhanced. 109 In this respect, the Commission apparently uses
the "common law" definition of mitigation, which emphasizes compensation
for wetland impacts rather than avoidance of impacts altogether. 110 The continued use of this definition of mitigation
adds confusion to the state/federal permitting scheme.
Water Resources Control Board. The
Water Resources Control Board
(WRCB)1 11 regulates wetlands indirectly
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through section 401 of the Clean Water
Act. Section 401 requires state water
quality certification as a prerequisite to
issuance of a section 404 dredge and fill
permit. 112 The WRCB may indirectly influence mitigation plans by instilling
conditions on the 401 certification which
must be accounted for in a mitigation
plan.113
The Water Resources Control Board
is currently considering whether to reissue nationwide permits under the section
404 permit program. 114 The WRCB has
the option of requiring individual section
401 water quality certification for each
project falling under the jurisdiction of
the nationwide permit program. If the
Board decides to exercise this authority,
its ability to condition permit approval
upon specific mitigation needs will
vastly increase.
Problems with Mitigation. As state
and federal agencies have struggled to
interpret, apply, and enforce mitigation
requirements in development projects
within their jurisdiction, several problems and criticisms have emerged which
have resulted-in part-in the concept
of mitigation banking. The following
discussion provides an overview of the
main criticisms of mitigation policies
which have surfaced over the last ten
years.
One of the primary criticisms of wetland mitigation is that it is used as a justification for wetland alteration. As noted
earlier, EPA and USFWS view mitigation as a "last resort" form of compensation for unavoidable environmental
impacts. These agencies require that efforts to avoid wetland impacts be exhausted before compensation is considered. However, the reality in many projects is that the developer ignores the
avoidance prerequisite and comes to the
table with a project which is sited in a
wetland area and is accompanied by either a mitigation plan or a proposal to
consult agency officials on mitigation.
Even when this approach is rebuffed by
resource agencies, however, few developers are discouraged to the point of
abandoning their projects. 115
The uncertainty of success of wetland
restoration and creation projects is perhaps the most important hurdle which
mitigation policy must overcome. While
some types of habitats have apparently
been successfully restored, the technology for restoring most types of habitats
is completely inadequate. For example,
some riparian habitats located in southern California have been restored fairly
successfully. 116 However, these projects
were sited in areas which probably
5
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would have revegetated on their own in
only slightly more time than it took with
the restoration effort. 117 On the other
hand, many mitigation projects try to
create too many types of habitat in one
area in order to accommodate more species at one site. These projects propose
increasing the quality of habitat in exchange for quantity, but generally result
in uncertainty or-more likely-a decrease in both quantity and quality. 118
Mitigation involving compensation,
particularly with regard to habitat creation and restoration, is still considered
an experimental process (at best) that has
been applied only on a limited basis. 119
The degree of uncertainty associated
with mitigation parallels the amount of
manipulation necessary to satisfy project
needs. Wetland enhancement has the
highest relative probability of success,
followed by wetland restoration, andfinally-wetland creation.
In almost any mitigation project,
some wetland vegetation can usually be
planted and survive. However, it is has
yet to be shown that an entire ecosystem
can be replaced or restored. The various
functions of very complicated natural
systems are simply not totally understood.120 Thus, the assumption upon
which most mitigation projects rely is
only that-an assumption which has
often been unquestioned, even by resource
agencies.
By conceding the loss of wetland
habitat values and moving directly to
discuss the issues of mitigation and the
technical merits of a proposal, a regulatory agency loses sight of the big picture.
The more important philosophical question is whether mitigation practices such
as habitat restoration and creation are
reasonable or justifiable in light of the
overall costs to the resource. For example, regardless of the quality or good intentions of a mitigation project, some
known habitat will be lost, and the shortand long-term success of the mitigation
project may remain uncertain for a number of years. Thus, there is necessarily a
trade-off of the loss of a known commodity in exchange for an uncertain
commodity.
The conspicuous absence of data relating to large-scale creation of wetland
ecosystems is even more troubling in
light of the assumptions of success often
made in mitigation policies. Historical
attempts to revegetate dredge spoils and
marsh areas with limited plantinip do not
create a functioning ecosystem. 21 Even
when a wetland area is carefully planted
and monitored, the functional success
may not be attained for many, many
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years. 122 As such, wetland creation
should be a last resort, compensating for
completely unavoidable impacts associated with water-dependent projects.
Moreover, wetland creation should never
be used to justify destruction of productive wetlands.
It can hardly be denied that habitat
restoration and enhancement benefit a
degrading wetland system. However, the
real issue is whether to allow wetland
destruction conditioned upon promises
or guarantees of wetland restoration or
creation, when both practices are based
upon an imperfect science and raise substantial institutional problems. 123
Even if a project is successful in taking on many of the attributes of a natural
habitat, there is still the intangible loss
of the character and history of the habitat
which is irreplaceable. To say that habitats may be destroyed because we can
recreate them is much like saying that
once we have the technology to balance
stones on top of each other, we can recreate Stonehenge and build a shopping
mall over the original. 124 Much of the
value of any natural ecosystem is that
each has its own history and no two are
identical. This value is not static; rather,
it is temporal and is difficult to quantify-in fact, so difficult that it is routinely ignored in habitat value assessments.
Another critical issue is whether a
mitigation project should replace precisely the same functions that are being
lost by the development project. In other
words, should wetland replacement be
in-kind (the same habitat type and size)
or out-of-kind (of different type and
size)? The danger of out-of-kind mitigation is that habitats which are difficult to
restore or enhance may be depleted and
not effectively replaced if they can be
mitigated for by restoring a different
type of wetland. Out-of-kind mitigation
leads to a net loss of habitat values of
the impacted habitat type. On the other
hand, out-of-kind mitigation may be desirable if a more scarce or valuable habitat is in critical need of expansion and
the habitat lost to development is relatively abundant.
Another controversial mitigation
issue is whether mitigation should take
place onsite (on or immediately adjacent
to the impacted site) or offsite (within a
reasonable distance from the impacted
site). One of the dangers in allowing
offsite mitigation is that it promotes fragmentation of wetland habitat. USFWS'
mitigation policy states that first priority
will be given to recommendation of a
mitigation site within the planning area,

and then adjacent to the project area; last
priority is given to recommendation of
mitigation sites elsewhere within the
same ecoregion of the project. 125
The parties responsible for carrying
out mitigation projects have also become
increasingly frustrated with mitigation
policies due to the costs and delay associated with mitigation. Developers saw
the costs of mitigation projects skyrocket
in the I 980s. The constantly changing
regulatory environment and shifting
agency policies have created an uncertain backdrop in which developers must
estimate project costs. Lengthy project
delays are common as permit applicants
and regulatory agencies discuss the details of mitigation requirements. If a
project is materially changed during construction, delays of months or even years
may result due to a backlog of permit
applications and/or the refusal of one
party to change the mitigation agreement.
These problems with mitigation policy have been relatively easy to identify.
Finding their solutions is much more difficult. The need for increased certainty
of success in mitigation projects, preferably ascertained before impacting the
resource, is viewed by biologists as the
top priority. Standardizing and consolidating regulatory requirements is also
necessary to instill predictability into the
planning process. In troubling economic
times, the development industry wants to
reduce the costs of mitigation as much
as possible. Regulatory agencies that are
finding themselves overworked and understaffed need a way to manage their
resources in a more efficient way. The
proposed use of mitigation banking is
seen as a potential method of resolving
many of these issues. Unfortunately, it
may exacerbate some of the existing
problems and create new ones.

MITIGATION BANKING
GENERALLY

The term "mitigation bank" has been
used to describe a wide variety of habitat
management policies, only some of
which are truly considered mitigation
banks. 126 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service 127 defines mitigation banking as
" ... habitat protection or improvement actions taken expressly for the purpose of
compensating for unavoidable, necessary
losses from specific future development
actions." 128 In practice, there is no such
thing as a "typical" mitigation bank, and
mitigation banking can work many variations off this central theme. 129
A simple, one-party mitigation bank
is similar to maintaining a bank ac-
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count. 130 A developer "opens an account" by entering into a memorandum
of agreement with regulatory agencies to
create, restore, or preserve wildlife habitat in advance of an anticipated need for
mitigation of impacts from a project. The
benefits of these efforts are quantified by
regulatory officials, and the developer
receives a "balance" of mitigation credits
in his or her account. Later, when the
developer proposes a project that includes unavoidable losses of fish and
wildlife habitat, the losses are quantified
and withdrawn from the mitigation bank
account. Withdrawals may be repeated as
long as mitigation credits remain in the
bank. The one-party mitigation bank has
been used by individuals who frequently
impact small or isolated areas of sensitive habitat and who have sufficient capital to create the bank. These include
large development and energy corporations and state Department of Transportation.
A variation on the one-party mitigation bank is the cooperative banking
group. In a mitigation bank co-op, several development interests agree to pool
their resources to create a mitigation
bank. Each party to the agreement receives mitigation credits proportionate to
their investment. Co-ops provide the
small and medium-sized developer with
an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of
mitigation banking while sharing the
threshold costs of regulatory review, land
acquisition, and habitat restoration. This
type of bank is likely to appeal to
homebuilder associations and other mutual interest organizations.
Another increasingly popular variation of mitigation banking is the thirds
party mitigation bank, which creates a
market for mitigation credits. Under this
scenario, an environmental restoration
business independently acquires land
and creates or restores wildlife habitat in
order to create a mitigation bank account. Mitigation credits are then sold to
development interests whose projects
impact similar habitat types in the area.
The benefit of this type of mitigation
banking is that it makes optimal use of
market forces through specialization,
thus theoretically reducing the cost of
mitigation to the developer.
A true mitigation bank is markedly
different from an "in-lieu fee program."
In-lieu fee programs are processes
whereby several developers agree with
resource agencies to pay fees into an account that, when enough money has accumulated, is used to purchase and enhance a sensitive habitat area. In-lieu fee
programs accumulate funds slowly, and

years may pass before a mitigation project is initiated and habitat losses are
compensated. 131
As a result, in-lieu fee programs generally lead to temporary losses of habitat
value. For example, in San Diego
County, an in-lieu fee program was initiated to compensate for damage to vernal pool habitats. An agreement was
signed by DFG, USFWS, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, and the City of San
Diego which allowed development and
sale of certain lands in exchange for deposits into an account to purchase sensitive property with vernal pools. The
project was flawed in its initial design
and was universally considered a dismal
failure. 132 On the day the agreement was
signed, the arrangement facilitated the
loss of considerable vernal pool habitat
and, even in a best-case scenario, would
compensate for less than 10% of that
loss. The reason for the "guaranteed failure" of this program was a refusal to require fees sufficient to acquire the necessary land. The total funds available
through the program were sufficient to
purchase only 10% of the land based on
per-acre values at the time the agreement
was signed. After the agreement was
signed, land prices escalated and the program became essentially useless in preserving the vernal pools.
Elements of a Mitigation Bank. As
noted, there is no such thing as a "typical" mitigation bank. However, there are
certain elements which all mitigation
banks must have in order to be identified
as such.
Bank Sponsor. First, there must be a
project sponsor which develops a plan
for creating new wetlands or restoring
degrading wetlands in some other area.
Mitigation bank sponsors historically
have been industry or government entities. The plan developed by the bank's
sponsor provides the basis for a memorandum of understanding among the various agencies which have permitting authority over the mitigation bank.
One of the bank sponsor's most difficult tasks is coordinating and mediating
issues among the multitude of agencies
and concerned interest groups that are involved in the design and implementation
of a mitigation bank. At minimum, these
agencies include state and federal permitting agencies such as the California
Coastal Commission, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, and the regional water
quality control boards; local permitting
agencies such as city and county planning commissions; commenting agencies
such as DFG, USFWS, EPA, and the National Marine Fisheries Service; environ-
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mental interest groups such as the Sierra
Club and Audubon Society; and local development interest groups. 133 With these
cumbersome bureaucracies and interest
groups, keeping the process moving toward a consensus on the myriad of decisions and issues among parties with diverging interests is one of the primary
challenges which the bank's sponsor will
encounter. 134
Written Agreement. The key to successful establishment of a mitigation
bank is a written banking agreement
which formalizes the consensus among
signatory agencies about the characteristics and use of the bank. The interagency
agreement establishes guidelines for
bank use and defines the allowable, required, and prohibited actions for all of
the parties involved. 135 A formal bank
agreement, usually known as a memorandum of understanding (MOU), generally involves all federal, state, and local
permitting and commenting agencies
with an interest in the outcome of the
project. The consensus among federal
agencies is that a mitigation bank MOU
should accomplish all of the following
goals:
• specify that the bank may be used
only when the permitting and commenting agencies agree that onsite mitigation
and other offsite mitigation options are
not appropriate, and that the bank has the
appropriate habitat value available;
• include or reference comprehensive
regional plans and goals to which the
bank plan is related;
• define the obligations and interests
of each of the parties involved;
• designate a mitigation bank overview team, if that team is different from
the signatories to the formal banking
agreement;
• incorporate, at least by reference,
the habitat enhancement plan, including
a long-term management plan, a list of
maintenance activities, and the entities
responsible for these activities;
• define the decisionmaking process
that will be used if conflicts arise concerning the agreement or the use of the
bank;
• establish who will hold legal title to
the land and other legal arrangements for
the bank land;
• limit the use of the bank to a clearly
defined geographic area;
• establish the size of the bank;
• include the methodology that will
be used to determine bank credits and
project debits, and the crediting and debiting process;
• establish a bank manager or coordinator who will maintain the official re-
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cord of credit and debit transactions for
the bank;
• identify the particular types of habitat eligible to be offset by the bank;
• specify the procedure for continued
monitoring and evaluation of the bank
and related adjustments in bank management or credits; and
• include any other restrictions appropriate for the bank. 136
In addition, the mitigation banking
agreement should preserve the autonomy
of the individual agencies. The signing
of the MOU should not preclude any of
the agencies from enforcing their responsibility to take appropriate action should
the bank later be used to facilitate inappropriate development projects or provide inadequate mitigation for project
losses.
Methods of Evaluating Success. The
primary assumption in establishing a
mitigation bank is that the restored or
created habitat will be successful in duplicating the habitat values lost from the
impacted site. Therefore, a clear, scientifically acceptable method of detennining existing habitat values and evaluating habitat values following enhancement of the bank site is an absolute necessity to any mitigation banking project. This is one of the most important
and most controversial elements of the
mitigation banking concept. However,
finding a system which is technically defensible, replicable, consistent, and applicable to different 7-/Jes of habitat has
proven problematic. 1
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's
habitat evaluation procedure (HEP) has
been commonly used in California; however, other pennitting agencies question
the system's reliability and flexibility in
evaluating mitigation success. 138 HEP
analysis is susceptible to extreme bias
and can be used to hide impacts caused
by the mitigation project itself. 139 In addition to HEP, other methods of habitat
evaluation have been developed or modified to specific projects, but these have
also been sharply criticized. 140
Duration. Nearly all agencies involved in mitigation banking agree that
if a development is pennanent, then the
mitigation bank should also be created
in perpetuity. Failure to create a permanent wetland bank and adhere to this
commitment is dangerous because
land-particularly in California-becomes increasingly valuable as it becomes scarce. Wetland mitigation sites
are already becoming increasingly
scarce, and pressure will build to begin
whittling away at the remaining sites as
land values rise further. If the land is not
8

dedicated in perpetuity, the bank's effective period should be at least as long as
the impact from the project which it mitigates.
Other Features. Another key feature
in establishing a mitigation bank is deciding whether the land for the mitigation site will be publicly or privately
owned. One advantage of keeping the
land in private ownership is that it retains a local property tax base 141 and
maintains a lead agency's role as risk
manager, rather than landlord. Some projects have kept the site in private ownership until all of the mitigation credits
are distributed, at which time the land is
deeded to a resource agency or nature
conservancy for management responsibility in perpetuity. 142 Finally, a mitigation bank must have a managing agency
which will oversee the management and
maintenance of the habitat in perpetuity_ 143
Prerequisites to Establishing a Mitigation Bank. Projects for which mitigation banking is an option are a small
subset of projects requiring mitigation. A
majority of projects which are originally
designed to impact wetlands should be
filtered out before reaching the question
of whether the use of a mitigation bank
is appropriate. 144 Even among those few
projects which may propose mitigation
banking, the practice is only appropriate
for a few. Most agencies involved in environmental permitting require the following prerequisites before considering
use of a mitigation bank:
• all attempts to avoid or minimize
impacts and to provide onsite miti§ation
have been absolutely exhausted; 14
• there is a demonstrated public benefit associated with the project which
outweighs the foreseeable detrimental
impacts on fish and wildlife resources;
• if the project is sited in a wetland,
the develo~ment project must be waterdependent; 46 and
• onsite mitigation means are unavailable or insufficient to meet project mitigation needs. 147
If all of these prerequisites are met,
then the possibility of creating (or using)
a wetland mitigation bank exists.

REGULATORY ACTION
Federal Mitigation Banking Guidelines. There are currently no comprehensive guidelines for establishing a
mitigation bank acceptable to all federal
regulators. 148 As a result, project proponents must piece together a general federal policy from independent actions of
various agencies.
The most well-known federal guide-

lines on m1t1gation banking originate
from USFWS' Interim Guidance on Mitigation Banking, which was adopted in
1983. 149 USFWS considers this Interim
Guidance its current statement on the use
of mitigation banks. The Interim Guidance is used for all habitat types and is
not restricted to wetland applications. 150
It also emphasizes that banking is but
one tool of many available to mitigate
unavoidable resource losses. The steps
recommended by USFWS in creating a
mitigation bank include the following:
• identify the agency or agencies with
which it seems appropriate to consider a
mitigation bank and form an interagency
team;
• identify an involved entity that is
willing to develop the bank's site prior
to its use as mitigation for project impacts;
• identify the types of wetlands that
should be included in the bank, emphasizing in-kind mitigation requirements;
• identify potential bank sites;
• evaluate the potential bank sites and
select the most suitable candidate sites;
• select the bank site and acquire the
land;
• complete a detailed site development plan and identify responsible entities for bank development and long-term
management;
• develop (restore or create habitat)
the bank site and determine available
credits using the selected evaluation
methodology;
• agree to the bank credit and debit
procedures, including any restrictions on
the use of bank credits; and
• use the bank, as appropriate, to mitigate for necessary and unavoidable project impacts. 151
The Interim Guidance sets forth ten
factors which must be considered in establishing and administering a wetland
mitigation bank (the list is not inclusive).152 In addition to its Interim Guidance, USFWS has also released a short
synopsis of mitigation banks with Fish
and Wildlife Service involvement. 153
This booklet expands on the principles
of the Interim Guidance and reviews several mitigation banks in progress or
planned for the near future.
EPA has not issued any fonnal nationwide policy on mitigation banking;
however, EPA's Office of Wetlands Protection released a policy statement to the
National Wetlands Policy Forum in
199 I. 154 The policy reiterates EPA's position on strict mitigation sequencing and
applies this policy to mitigation banking
as well. EPA defines wetlands mitigation
banking as "a comprehensive advanced
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planning approach for compensating for
the unavoidable loss of wetlands or wetland functions resulting from development actions where mitigation cannot be
achieved at the site of impact." 155 The
EPA definition includes restoration of
existing wetlands and the creation of
new wetlands from uplands; 156 however,
EPA considers the simple purchase or
"preservation" 157 of existing wetlands as
acceptable mitigation in very rare instances. 158
In general, EPA considers mitigation
banking as an experimental conce~t
which should not be widely used. 1 9
EPA has also established several prerequisites to the consideration of a wetlands
mitigation bank. 160 Once the prerequisites are met, the project satisfies the
404(b)(I) guidelines, and all other impacts are minimized, mitigation banking
may be considered to reduce the remaining unavoidable impacts below a level
of significant degradation.
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) also provided informal
comments to the National Wetlands Policy Forum on its position on mitigation
banking. NMFS expressed concern about
the feasibility of mitigation banking and
the affordability of obtaining land in the
coastal zone for habitat improvement. 161
NMFS also criticized current habitat
credit/evaluation procedures, which it
believes are overly complex and unreliable in estuarine or marine areas. 162
NMFS agreed with EPA and USFWS
that preservation is a mitigation technique used only in the rarest of occasions. However, NMFS differs from the
other federal resource agencies in viewing fees paid in exchange for banking
credits as a new step in mitigation sequencing. 163
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
has generally not accepted the concept
of mitigation banking, preferring instead
to consider each permit request on its
own merits. 164 In response to a North
Carolina mitigation bank created by
USFWS, the Nature Conservancy, and
the North Carolina Department of Transportation, the Corps bristled at the idea
of granting habitat credits when it was
not involved in the planning and design
stages of the mitigation bank. The Corps
has not produced any formal or informal
guidelines on mitigation banking.
The executive branch has been active
in providing policy regarding mitigation
banks. In August 1991, the Bush administration proposed to create an interagency panel to rank the environmental
value of various wetlands and to create
"a market-oriented mitigation banking

system" to let developers obtain and
trade credits for restoring and filling wetlands.165 At the time, then-President
Bush stated that this proposal would
"balance two important objectives: the
protection, restoration, and creation of
wetlands, and the need for sustained economic growth and development." 166
This statement is in direct contradiction
to Mr. Bush's previous campaign statements that "my position on wetlands is
straightforward: all existing wetlands, no
matter how small, should be preserved."167
With a new presidential administration and at least forty bills currently
pending before Congress regarding wetland issues, it is probable that a federal
statutory scheme of mitigation banking
will be -produced within the current congressional session. Congress has already
shown its interest in mitigation banking
by passing the Surface Transportation
Act, which includes a provision authorizing funding for state transportation departments to establish wetland mitigation
banks. 168 Until a uniform federal policy
is established, project applicants must
discern and apply the policy of the particular agency or agencies reviewing
their project.
State Mitigation Banking Guidelines. To date, the only state guidelines
for mitigation banking originate from the
Department of Fish and Game. The
guidelines are more specific-and much
more optimistic-than those of any federal agency. DFG's Guidelines on Mitigation Banking (DFG Guidelines) were
formulated in 1991 to "achieve a high
degree of uniformity and consistency in
the establishment of [mitigation] banks
throughout the state." 169 They are to be
applied at all future wetland mitigation
banks.
The DFG Guidelines state that whenever possible, projects should be designed so they do not impact wetlands.
However, DFG notes that impact avoidance is not always feasible, in which
case impacts to wetland habitat must
minimized.
DFG also recognizes that onsite mitigation is at times either infeasible or undesirable from a biological perspective.170 Citing piecemeal urban development as a cause of wetland loss and encroachment upon seasonal and permanent wetlands, DFG supports regional
planning prior to urban expansion so that
wetland impacts are minimized. The
Guidelines are not optimistic that wetland impacts can be eliminated in the future and make no strong statement that
such a policy should be instituted. 171
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The Department's Wetland Resource
Policy 172 requires that establishment of
a mitigation bank must be accomplished
through the conversion of an upland area
to wetland habitat. 173 Conversion of upland area to wetland habitat is to be
achieved by reconfiguring the area
through excavation and/or construction
of levies so that the area remains inundated long enough to assume characteristics of a wetland. 174 The precise character of a wetland present in a wetland
mitigation bank is to be controlled
through management practices applied to
that area and, once established, wetland
habitat values in the bank will be determined by a team of wetland experts. 175
Once a mitigation bank is approved,
the project proponents may mitigate the
wetland impacts of their projects by purchasing an appropriate number of mitigation credits from the owner of the
bank. The guidelines define a mitigation
credit as "a unit of measured area supporting wetland habitat and wetland habitat values not pre-existing at the bank
site prior to bank development. Each
such unit shall have been assigned a habitat value by the DFG in consultation
with other appropriate resource agencies."176
The DFG Guidelines require that
banks be established near areas of expected future wetland impacts to ensure
that those wetland resources being impacted will benefit from bank establishment. Wetland mitigation banks are
therefore required to be created within
40 miles of the impacted area. 177 Mitigation banks must also be sited in areas
that minimize potential conflicts with
present and future adjacent land uses.
Under the Guidelines, wetland mitigation banks also may not result in the
loss of upland habitat which is especially
valuable to wildlife, and may not result
in any uncompensated adverse impacts
to existing wetlands. 178
Wetland mitigation banks are also required to include buffer zones from
which no wetland mitigation credits of
any kind may accrue. The use of buffer
zones is designed to minimize disturbance on the most sensitive s~ecies inhabiting the wetland habitat. 17
The DFG Guidelines also require that
no uses of bank sites may reduce wetland acreage or habitat values onsite, and
DFG will limit land uses adjacent to estab Ii shed mitigation banks to those
which are compatible with bank operations. In the alternative, DFG will seek
the provision of expanded buffer zones
and other mitigation actions to assure
that future incompatible land uses will
9
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not result in diminished habitat values. 180
Perhaps most important, the DFG
Guidelines set a minimum size of 50
acres of newly created wetland habitat
for wetland mitigation banks unless special circumstances warrant otherwise. 181
The DFG Guidelines promote the establishment of a few relatively large banks,
rather than the development of many
small banks. 182
DFG does not always require mitigation to occur before credits are issued.
Newly formed wetland mitigation banks
which are planned but not yet implemented may be used to offset project
impacts with the prior approval of the
DFG Director. These approvals must be
obtained strictly on a case-by-case basis,
and the ratio of mitigation credits to
project-induced wetland losses must exceed one-to-one to ensure that no net
loss of either wetland acreage or wetland
habitat values results from the project. 183
The DFG Guidelines require adequate funding for operation and maintenance of restored habitat in perpetuity,
and require that title to privately-held
mitigation bank lands shall be encumbered by a permanent conservation easement in favor of DFG or a nonprofit conservation organization. The DFG Guidelines also require that each mitigation
bank be supplied with a guaranteed and
permanent source of water of adequate
quantity and quality to permanently support continual optimum wetland acreage
and maximize wetland habitat values. 1114
Only in the final paragraph of its
Guidelines does DFG note that current
technology is insufficient to ensure the
duplication of the ecology of any type
of wetland, and this language is limited
to man's inability to duplicate vernal
pools. Otherwise, the rather naive assumption that wetland habitats may be
recreated permeates the DFG Guidelines.
Most mitigation banking in California
has been limited to compensating the
loss of deep water marine habitat
through the creation of shallow subtidal
estuarine areas. 185 DFG claims that this
program possesses a high probability of
success because of the relative ease of
creating shallow subtidal habitat for
nearshore fishes. However, there is considerable disagreement as to whether
mitigation of such subtidal habitats actually creates a working ecosystem. 186 The
Guidelines state hopefully that "there
does not appear to be any reason, however, why the same banking principles
cannot be successfully employed to compensate the loss of wetland habitat provided that the conditions for wetland
mitigation bank establishment defined in
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these guidelines are implemented." 187
This statement is troubling because DFG
equates the relative ease of (apparently)
duplicating fish habitat with the ability
to reconstruct a complex wetland ecosystem. The available evidence points in
precisely the opposite direction.

POLICY ISSUES
REGARDING MITIGATION BANKS

Potential Benefits. The premise underlying mitigation is protection of valuable natural resources. Therefore, by definition, the habitat must be the primary
beneficiary of a mitigation bank and
these benefits should be the reason the
bank project is undertaken.
The habitat potentially benefits from
banking because mitigation efforts are
concentrated on creating expansive,
quality wildlife habitat rather than fragmented, project-specific efforts. The diversity of species in an ecosystem is
often correlated with the size of habitat
area, and the larger the habitat area, the
greater the potential for a self-sustaining
ecosystem. Because banking provides a
mechanism for regional planning and
implementation of more general wetland
protection policies, mitigation banks
allow for the consolidation of mitigation
from small wetland losses. 188 This is important for several reasons. It provides a
fine mesh sieve to catch wetland losses
resulting from numerous piecemeal decisions which individually account for
negligible wetland losses, but cumulatively represent some of the most significant wetland losses. 189 By satisfying the
mitigation needs of a number of projects
that are small in terms of impacted area,
a larger and more environmentally valuable area may be restored and/or preserved in a more efficient manner than
the several scattered sites. This will slow
the current process of whittling away the
wetland resource. 190
Perhaps the most significant benefit
of mitigation banking is an enhanced
ability to predict success of compensation when the mitigation action is initiated. Most mitigation bank MOUs require that the mitigation be done in advance of the impacts and that the restoration be considered successful prior to
project approval. Thus, mitigation banking theoretically provides the opportunity to assess the success of a mitigation
project prior to agencies "signing off' on
the project. Through the terms specified
in an MOU, adjustments can be made in
the restoration actions so that specific
objectives may be achieved. 191
If resource agencies stringently adhere to this requirement, mitigation

banking could result either in an acceleration of wetland restoration technology
because of the increased demand for successful projects, or-if early efforts
prove unsuccessful-the mitigation-inadvance requirement could become a
significant deterrent to projects with wetland impacts. 192
Mitigation banking can also benefit
participating businesses through reduced
mitigation costs. Instead of each developer fronting the costs of mitigation design, permitting, construction, and monitoring, these expenses are pooled, reducing threshold costs. Mitigation banking relieves project proponents of the
need to individually locate mitigation
sites to compensate for their wetland impacts and create or restore the required
wetland acreage. 193 Specialization and
economies of scale can reduce the per
unit cost of mitigation. Moreover, mitigation requirements are better defined up
front, avoiding costly delays during construction.
The entrepreneur restoration business
benefits through the creation of a new
market for proactive habitat restoration
and preservation efforts. In addition,
some businesses have found that the best
return on their investment in non-developable land may be to sell the land for
use as a mitigation site. Alternatively,
they may donate the land to a nature conservancy for banking purposes, obtaining
a valuable tax break and public relations
bonus.
In addition, the mitigation bank may
provide an opportunity to consolidate the
financial and management resources of a
number of different entities, supporting
mitigation projects that would not be feasible for a single permit applicant. 194 For
example, in the Tijuana River Valley in
south San Diego County, a major tidal
restoration plan has been designed to enhance hundreds of acres of sensitive salt
marsh habitat. The price tag on the entire
project will likely exceed $30 million, an
amount that is unlikely to come from any
single funding source. 195
Mitigation banking also streamlines
the regulatory process by bringing the
necessary agencies together at an early
stage of the planning process, minimizing conflicts which can be costly and
time-consuming down the road. This
shift provides predictability and lowers
the costs of the planning process. Because mitigation banking actions should
be approved and implemented prior to
permit actions taking place, conflicts
such as misunderstandings, uncertainty
of success, and delayed permit reviews
are minimized. In addition, because
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banking proposals often encourage or incorporate comprehensive planning efforts, they may receive closer scrutiny
than conventional mitigation plans, increasing the quality of review and the
quality of the project. 196
Mitigation banking is also more efficient for regulatory agencies. Resource
agencies typically lack the personnel and
funds to monitor compliance, and permit
applicants often fail or neglect to implement mitigation requirements. 197 Instead
of evaluating and monitoring scattered
piecemeal mitigation projects, agencies
could concentrate their efforts on fewer,
more defined projects. The savings in
staff time allows a more efficient allocation of regulatory resources. And because success may be required prior to
granting mitigation credits, monitoring
and evaluation are easier, more efficient,
and better organized with the fewer,
larger sites used in mitigation banks. In
addition, the formal mitigation banking
agreement (MOU) can be used as a legal
commitment to establish responsibility
for follow-up evaluation activities and
for reaching parties after the mitigation
credits are granted.
Mitigation banking also increases the
potential for offsetting agency costs associated with the bank development
through the sale of mitigation credits.
The California Coastal Conservancy has
recommended a premium of I 0% of
project costs to offset the sponsor's administrative costs. Such a premium may
be used to help fund some of the agencies which must review mitigation bank
plans. 198
The consolidation of mitigation efforts also limits the number of parties involved in the restoration or creation of
habitat. With fewer opportunities available to restore larger wetland areas and
a high demand for restoration and creation services, the consolidation of mitigation should provide a competitive advantage to those who can successfully
create or restore habitats. Thus, the science and technology of wetland restoration and creation should improve with
mitigation banking. 199
Finally, wetland mitigation banking
establishes a market price for habitat
loss. Once the mitigation bank has been
established and is deemed successful, the
charge for mitigation credits may be set
and resource agencies can give applicants a ball-park figure on the cost of
mitigation. 200 At this point, the expense
of mitigation may deter some applicants
from proceeding with projects that impact wetlands. Knowing the established
price up front may also induce the permit

applicant to fund a more cost-effective
project, or redesign the develo~ment
project to lessen wetland impacts. DI
Potential Hazards. As desirable as
mitigation banking appears to be, the
concept has its share of critics. One of
the primary complaints from these critics
is that most of the policy and technical
issues raised by the typical mitigation
project must also be resolved with regard
to a mitigation bank. Moreover, since
mitigation banks generally involve larger
habitat areas, the risks associated with
mitigation practices are magnified. Because it may take several years to evaluate the success of a mitigation bank, design flaws and poor decisions early in
the process may lead to an unsuccessful
project which fails to compensate for impacts from several development projects
which ,have already been built. The issue
then becomes whether the bank sponsor
will be required to invest additional
funds for remedial efforts. The extensive
planning and consultation process required in most mitigation bank agreements theoretically lessens the likelihood
of the problem of large-scale failures;
however, several other hazards of mitigation banks are not as easily resolved.
A summary of these problems follows.
Mitigation banking raises the fundamental question whether it is possible or
even desirable to attempt to recreate an
ecosystem. In I 985, the EPA began a
multi-level research program to examine
scientific issues which result from wetland creation and restoration projects.
The work resulted in a two-volume publication examining regional success in
wetland creation and restoration projects
and provided scientific commentary and
policy outlays for future mitigation. 202
The EPA program concluded that duplication of naturally occurring wetlands is
impossible, and that partial project failures are common. 203 The ability to restore and create particular wetland functions varies by the nature of that function. However, successful habitat created
should reproduce all of the functional attributes of a naturally occurring ecosystem. Characteristics such as topography
may be created with relative ease, while
the creation of microbiological soil processing may be exceedingly difficult.
While structural characteristics may be
attainable, functional characteristics are
more difficult to assess and do not lend
themselves to reliable predictions of success in the planning stages.
Another finding of the EPA study was
that long-term success may be quite different from short-term success, and longterm success often depends upon the
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ability to assess, recreate, and manipulate the hydrology of the wetland system .204 Other factors contributing to
probability of success include the longterm ability to manage, protect, and manipulate the wetlands and adjacent buffer
zones, and the relative level of expertise
in project design and supervision. The
study emphasized that the establishment
of the proper topography and hydrology
alone will not assure success of a restoration or creation project. Instead, considerable energy must be spent in replanting, regrading, removal of exotics,
periodic dredging, adoption of pollution
controls for streams and drainage ditches
running into the wetlands, construction
of fences and other barriers to restrict intrusion by humans and domestic animals,
and systematic monitoring and adjustments in order to fill the gaps in scientific knowledge. 205
The consensus reached by all reviewe~ of mitigation efforts across the country is that mitigation efforts cannot yet
claim to have duplicated lost wetland
functional values. Constructed or restored wetlands do not yet maintain regional biodiversity or recreate functional
ecosystems and, while constructed wetlands may look like natural wetlands,
few data are available to show that they
behave like natural ones. 206 Thus, the
science of wetland restoration and creation-one of the most important premises upon which mitigation banking relies-is also one of the most clearly underachieved aspects of the mitigation
process.
A related criticism of mitigation and
mitigation banking is the inability to establish universal objective criteria for
measuring "success." Often blanket
statements of success are provided by
project progonents without data to verify
the claim. 2 7 Several assessment systems
have been produced; however, their effectiveness in measuring habitat values
and providing indicia of success over a
broad array of habitat types has been
questioned. For example, USFWS' habitat evaluation procedures (HEP) 208 have
been criticized for the limited number of
factors used in estimating success, 209
and has been considered by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers to be inapIJlicable to coastal wetland evaluations. 2 IO
Other evaluation techniques have met
with similar criticism. 211 The establishment of some consensus on the system
or systems to be used in verifying the
"success" of mitigation banks is an immediate necessity if mitigation banks are
to be compared and mitigation credits
traded.
11
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Mitigation efforts have historically
focused on creating habitat for one or
more target species, and have not maintained a larger focus on restoring habitat.
As a result, mitigation criteria for assessing success of past projects have emphasized the presence or absence of certain
species, or a certain density of plants, to
signify successful restoration efforts.
These criteria simplify and skew the
evaluation process in favor of finding
regulatory compliance by measuring
only a fraction of the components of the
habitat. For example, projects measured
solely by sufficient plant densities may
resemble gardens more than natural habitat; however, in terms of regulatory
compliance, the project would be a "success." Moreover, apfearances of success
can be deceiving. 2 Ecosystems are extremely complex and, in order to assess
functional success in establishing a viable ecosystem, all aspects of the restored
habitat must be monitored and evaluated.
Finally, even after the project has been
evaluated for functional success, the habitat values should be maintained over
time-at least as long as the time the destroyed habitat would have functioned.
To illustrate an additional problem in
assessing success, what happens when
the mitigation bank is designed to create
a certain type of habitat, but another type
actually results? For example, if a project is designed to create salt marsh habitat on dredge spoils for the endangered
light-footed clapper rail, but the vegetation fails to survive because the habitat
elevation is too high, should the project
proponent receive mitigation credit if
other important birds use it as a nesting
site (e.g., the endangered least tern)? The
habitat that is unintentionally created is
clearly valuable, but the end result is a
net loss of one type of habitat with no
measurable in-kind compensation. Moreover, is it proper to reward mitigation
failures? On the other hand, the project
proponent has invested a large sum of
money in the attempted mitigation and
would undoubtedly object to the imposition of new mitigation requirements, particularly if the development project has
already been constructed. These types of
evaluation issues must be resolved before a mitigation bank is created.
Even assuming relative success in
some types of habitat manipulation and
an ability to evaluate and verify that success, some ecosystems are more complicated and more difficult to duplicate than
others. Increased complexity generally
translates into increased risks and costs
for the project proponent(s). As a result,
project proponents will favor creating or
12

restoring habitats that are relatively simple to understand and recreate, and guarantee a greater likelihood of success.
This situation becomes problematic
when these restored habitats differ fundamentally from the habitat that is impacted by the development project.
When the mitigation bank is created by
a private "restoration corporation" which
creates or restores habitat for profit, 213
the corporation will seek to restore that
habitat on which it can maintain a decent
profit margin. Logically, it will develop
the easiest habitats to restore, and such
habitats may become abundant at the expense of more complex habitats.
In addition, the well-intended act of
mitigation by habitat manipulation may
actually have adverse effects on a natural
habitat. Habitat manipulation necessarily
disturbs an ecosystem by changing the
physical characteristics of the environment.214 This practice encourages the
proliferation of species which can tolerate disturbance (e.g., exotic species) and
inhibits more sensitive, specialized species. As a result, many mitigation projects fall short of projected biodiversity
and are often colonized by the wrong
species. 215 Worse, further manipulation
is not necessarily the remedy; once the
habitat is colonized, it may take years to
eradicate exotic or opportunistic species.216
The invasion of exotic plants and animals is a serious problem in sensitive
habitats everywhere, and the problem is
potentially exacerbated by large mitigation projects which manipulate habitat
near existing natural habitat. Unless
proper controls are used, invasive species will likely colonize a restored habitat, and then spread to nearby natural
habitat. The resulting degradation of the
natural habitat is generally unaccounted
for in the mitigation process and represents potential impacts from the act of
mitigation itself. Such impacts would
clearly reduce the number of available
mitigation credits available in a bank
system; however, it is unclear if such impacts are ever considered when calculating mitigation credits.
Critics of mitigation banking also
fear that widespread use and acceptance
of the concept will be interpreted as a
relaxation of regulatory standards or, at
the very least, a regulatory compromise,
instead of a change in the method of implementing those standards. These fears
stem from at least two sources. First,
mitigation banking combines the regulatory requirements of several potentially
conflicting state and federal laws. Some
of these regulations are considered "in-

ternally balanced," meaning that
resource interests and development interests were balanced when the laws and
regulations were drafted and no further
balancing is necessary. 217 Other statutes
require a further balancing of these interests on a case-by-base basis. 218 By integrating the two applications, the internally balanced regulations may be balanced against the development interest a
second time, diluting the effectiveness of
the regulation. 219
A second basis for the fear of regulatory relaxation is an expectation of
some interests that key factors in section
404 permit processing will be relaxed
where ambitious compensatory mitigation projects are proposed. 220 The Foundation for Environmental and Economic
Progress has opined that adherence to requiring avoidance of impacts before considering banking proposals could fatally
defer meritorious mitigation banking
projects. 221 Such relaxation of standards,
while not yet evident, remains an inherent danger of mitigation banking.
Conservation groups and regulatory
agencies also fear that large-scale habitat
loss may result due to "bounced checks"
from ineffective mitigation bank efforts.
This fear stems from the reality that mitigation banking currently brings with it
substantial risks which can only be partially resolved in the planning process.222 Because the current status of the
science of habitat creation and restoration is uncertain, each project carries a
risk of failure. "Bounced checks" are
possible in light of likely political pressures to allow the project proponent off
the hook if it makes a good faith effort
to comply with the agency's mitigation
requirements. Forcing supplemental mitigation efforts on the project proponent
would likely result in litigation and
lengthy delays, at the expense of the habitat.
Finally, several key problems with
mitigation banks are based on the economics of the process. A key concern is
whether the price of the mitigation credits sold for a bank will equal, exceed, or
fall short of the cost of creating or restoring the habitat. 223 Estimating the cost
of mitigation is almost as uncertain a
venture as predicting probability of success. The cost of mitigation for individual developers is already high. While
mitigation banks will theoretically reduce costs, until mitigation banking has
been tried and evaluated, the degree to
which the concept will actually reduce
costs to the developer is unclear. For example, because a third party may be involved in the bank (the restoration spe-
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cialist), this third party will want to be
compensated for the risk of not being
able to produce acceptable habitat. Some
estimates of the overhead necessary to
make a restoration specialist profitable in
mitigation banking are upwards of five
to six times upfront costs. 224
If the costs of a mitigation bank exceed the amount paid out by developer
interests for mitigation credits, a new
problem arises: Who gets stuck with the
remainder of the costs? If the government is forced to pick up the tab, then
we have created an externality wherein
the government (i.e., the taxpayer) is
subsidizing the development interests. 225
Public agencies such as the California
Coastal Conservancy often sponsor mitigation banks and run the risk of not getting reimbursed. However, if mitigation
banking is to become a viable alternative
in the permitting process, this risk must
be assumed by the developers.

CONCLUSION
Mitigation banking is seen by many
as an inevitable force in future California
habitat management practices. The pressures to develop sensitive resources and
the scarcity of those resources overwhelmingly favor some sort of regional,
permanent wildlife management. However, in light of the significant flaws in
the concept itself and in the available information regarding ecosystem reproduction, the immediate use of mitigation
banking should be tempered. As EPA has
noted, the concept is experimental, and
should be treated cautiously. Moreover,
as mitigation banking is implemented,
each project should be used as a vehicle
to improve upon the system and begin
to eliminate some of the uncertainties
and problems in implementation.
Despite the recognized scientific uncertainty in restoration ecology and the
creation of functionally equivalent habitats, resource agencies are reluctant to include experimental procedures in mitigation plans. According to EPA's Region
IX Office of Wetlands Protection, EPA's
primary concern is for mitigation on the
basis of acreage and EPA does not approve of the inclusion of experimentation in a mitigation/restoration plan. This
attitude promotes maintenance of the status quo-scientific uncertainty-at a
time when scientific advances are clearly
needed.
The rationale for EPA's position is
understandable: With experimentation
necessarily comes some uncertainty and,
in any experiment, certain treatments
will succeed better than others. When
habitat values are at such a premium, it

is difficult to defend the use of mitigation requirements for experimentation.
However, it is essential that mitigation
practices begin not only to account for
losses of habitat acreage, but also to promote the advancement of the science by
setting aside enough resources to include
experimentation in the mitigation
plan.226
Knowledge should be gained and the
status of the science should be advanced
at every possible point. Currently, there
is no unified effort to gain any scientific
knowledge from routine projects, and
there is certainly no mechanism for assimilating information learned in projects throughout the nation or state. Mitigation banking practices should be
adapted to help resolve some of these
problems.
By incorporating scientific research
programs into individual mitigation bank
projects, the science of wetland restoration can become an iterative process.
Restoration and experimentation should
occur in phases, with each successive
phase using the knowledge gained from
the previous phase to refine future mitigation design and techniques. Through
this sequence, the problem of scientific
uncertainty may slowly be resolved with
minimum damage to the natural habitat.
Integration of experimental treatments into mitigation plans also makes
sense from an economic standpoint.
Classical economists may purport that
scientific advancement and more successful mitigation projects will evolve
via the market system. That is, as projects become more efficient and effective
at restoring habitat due to technological
and scientific advances, the market system will favor these projects and encourage further research and development of
restoration techniques. Unfortunately,
the market system in the wetland mitigation arena lacks several fundamental
prerequisites. Not only is the market for
restorable habitat extremely constrained,
parties seeking restoration are also limited. These limitations mean the market
system will work much too slowly to advance the science of restoration at a pace
greater than habitat loss in California.
As noted, the wetland resource in
California is greatly depleted and diminishing on a daily basis. If the market system is the only force encouraging scientific advances in restoration ecology, the
resource will be eliminated by the time
the science advances to the point necessary for successful functional replacement (assuming that is possible). In other
words, California simply does not have
the luxury of relying solely on the mar-
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ket system to adjust the status of the science of wetland mitigation; the resource
is simply too scarce. Moreover, the permit applicant should not be allowed to
consider the partial expenditure of mitigation funds to further the science as
compensation for lost habitat; rather, the
cost of funding research is partial compensation for the risks of failure in restoring the habitat values lost to development.227
To summarize, state and federal agencies should agree to and implement a
policy that will routinely assimilate experimentation into project designs, not at
the expense of the resource but in addition to mitigation requirements. Parallel
to these efforts, a data bank should be
created to establish goals for scientific
progress and to coordinate and disseminate information as it arrives. This means
extensive consultation with scientific experts and an increased emphasis on the
roles of universities in establishing a viable statewide mitigation plan. Through
the cooperation of private industry, public agencies, and academic institutions,
the science of wetland habitat creation
and restoration, and mitigation banking,
could have a bright future. If these institutions do not work together, the concept
of mitigation banking may face early
foreclosure.
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revised in response to court actions and
indecisive administration.
65. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 64, at 324-25. This shared custody
has hampered the effectiveness of the
section 404 program in realizing its
goals. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND
REGULATION (1984) at 167.
66. 33 U.S.C. § I 344(a) ( 1986).
67. EPA may veto a permit "whenever [the EPA administrator] determines ... that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal
water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery
areas ... , wildlife, or recreation areas." 33
U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1986).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(I) (1986).
69. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,336-57 (Dec.
24, 1980), codified at 40 C.F.R. § 230
et seq. The sequential application of mitigation requires avoidance first, minimization second, and mitigation as compensation as a last resort. See supra text
accompanying note 34.
70. See Critical Issues, supra note
44, at 4.
71. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS' ADMINISTRATION OF THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM
37 (1988) (hereinafter "GAO REPORT");
see also Theodore J. Griswold, Comment, Wetland Protection Under Section

404 of the Clean Water Act: An Enforcement Paradox, 27:1 SAN DIEGO L. REY.
139 (1990).
72. See Critical Issues, supra note
44, at 4.
73. Id.
74. These terms apply only to compensatory mitigation, which is theoretically a small subset of the total mitigation concept. See infra text accompanying notes 144--47.
75. Critical Issues, supra note 44, at
4.
76. 674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987),
ajf'd sub nom Bersani v. Robichaud, 850
F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1089 (1989) (hereinafter "Bersant').
77. The case involved a development company proposing a project in a
50-acre wetland area which would alter
or fill 32 acres of wetlands, create nine
replacement acres of wetlands from nine
acres of onsite uplands, and alter another
13 wetland acres onsite to enhance their
habitat value. An additional 36 acres of
replacement wetlands were proposed to
be create offsite. The Corps notified EPA
of its intent to issue the permit for the
project, reasoning that the proposed mitigation would allow the project to satisfy
the Corps' public interest test.
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78. Bersani, supra note 76, 850 F.2d
at 42-43. See also WILLIAM L. WANT,
LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION 6-28
( 1989).
79. Bersani, supra note 76, 850 F.2d
at 39-40. The district court's decision
was based more on deference to EPA
than on a tacit approval of EPA mitigation policy, 674 F. Supp. at 413; the appellate court somewhat reluctantly affirmed, 850 F.2d at 45. Thus, after a
drawn-out legal proceeding, the mitigation debate remained unresolved and the
interagency battle resumed.
80. Bersani, supra note 76, 850 F.2d
at 44.
81. Id. at 46. For an in-depth review
of Bersani and its enhancement of EPA's
role in the section 404 program, see
Shannon L. Kilgore, Comment, EPA s

Evolving Role in Wetlands Protection:
Elaboration in Bersani v. U.S. EPA,
XVIII: 11 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10479, 10480 (1988).
82. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Department of the Army
Concerning the Determination of Mitigation under the Clean Water Act Section
404(b )(I) Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg.
51,320 (Dec. 14, 1989), amended 55
Fed. Reg. 1726 (Jan. 18, 1990), revised
55 Fed. Reg. 9211 (Mar. 12, 1990) (hereinafter "EPA/Army MOA"). For a detailed analysis of the MOA, see William
L. Want, The Army-EPA Agreement on
Wetlands Mitigation, XX:6 ENVTL. L.
REP. I 0209 (1990); Oliver A. Houck,

More Net Loss of Wetlands: The ArmyEPA Memorandum of Agreement on Mitigation Under the §404 Program, XX:6
ENYTL. L. REP. 10212 (1990) (hereinafter "More Net Loss").
83. The MOA states in part: "The
Corps ... first makes a determination that
potential impacts have been avoided to
the maximum extent practicable; remaining unavoidable impacts will then be
mitigated to the extent appropriate and
practicable by requiring steps to minimize impacts, and, finally, compensate
for aquatic resource values." EPA/Army
MOA, supra note 82, at Part Il(C) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at Part Il(C)( I). However,
other agencies still view compensatory
mitigation as serving this function. See
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE,
SOUTHWEST REGION, HABITAT PROTECTION POLICY: OVERVIEW OF NMFS ACTIVITIES IN CALIFORNIA (U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 1978).
85. EPA/Army MOA, supra note 82,
at Part III(B). The overall standard for

the amount of mitigation required under
the Memorandum is that functional value
must be replaced consistent with the no
net loss policy, with an adequate margin
of safety to reflect the expected degree
of success associated with the mitigation
plan. Id. Less than one-to-one acreage
replacement is allowed where the functional values of the impacted area are
low and the likelihood of successful mitigation is high.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. More Net Loss, supra note 82, at
10212.
The MOA was challenged for failure
to comply with the rulemaking procedures of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, but the case was dismissed
as not ripe for judicial review. Municipality of Anchorage, et al. v. United
States of America, et al., No. A89-503
( 1990). Also, the Bush administration attempted to amend the section 404(b )(I)
guidelines to exempt the filling of wetlands in Alaska from the sequential mitigation steps. 57 Fed Reg. 52,716
( 1992). The Bush proposal identified
several special circumstances in Alaska
which purportedly warrant deviation
from the sequential mitigation requirements. These include Alaska's historical
loss of less than I% of the state's wetland acreage; the fact that a dominant
proportion (40%) of Alaska's wetlands
are already in state or federal conservation units, including parks, refuges, and
other controlled ownerships; and the
claim that the high percentage of land in
Alaska identified as wetlands creates a
situation where no practicable alternatives to wetlands filling for development
are available. Id. at 52,717. At this writing, EPA is receiving comments on this
proposed amendment.
89. WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION 13-11 ( 1989).
90. See, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE§ 21000 et seq.; California Endangered Species Act, CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE § 2050 et seq.; California Coastal
Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
30000 et seq.
91. 14 CAL. CODE REGS. § 15386
(Resources Agency's Guidelines for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act).
92. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § §
160l(a), 1603 (West 1993).
93. DFG is authorized by the California Environmental Quality Act, Pub.
Res. Code§ 21000 et seq., the California
Endangered Species Act, Fish & Game
Code § 2050 et seq., and the Fish and
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Game Code generally to comment on the
adequacy of measures to protect these resources from project impacts.
94. PUB. RES. CODE§§ 21080.2,
21080.4, 21153; 14 CAL. CODE REGS.§§
I 5063(g}, 15086, 15386. DFG 's comments must be consistent with the state
Resources Agency's "policy for preservation of wetlands in perpetuity." Mira
Monte Homeowners Ass'n v. County of
Ventura, 165 Cal. App. 3d 357, 364
( 1985).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 662; see also 33
C.F.R. § 320.3(e).
96. The Fish and Game Commission
is DFG's policymaking board. CAL. FISH
& GAME CODE§ 100 et seq. The Commission codifies its formal regulations in
Title 14, Division I, of the California
Code of Regulations.
97. The policy was actually adopted
by the Fish and Game Commission in
1987. See 8:3 CAL. REG. L. REP. 112
(Summer 1988); 8: I CAL. REG. L. REP.
94-95 (Winter 1988). DFG subsequently
adopted an informal "position" on mitigation and wetland protection which the
Department believes is wholly consistent
with the Commission's policy. That policy is contained in Don Lollock, The Status of Wetland Habitat and Its Protection, Enhancement, and Expansion (Cal.
Dep't of Fish and Game, Envtl. Services
Division, 1987) (hereinafter "DFG Policy").
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. This phrase is ambiguous,
and is not further defined in the California Code of Regulations.
JOO. Id. These techniques are apparently used both individually and in concert; however, there is no policy requiring DFG to apply them sequentially, as
EPA and USFWS do. See text accompanying notes 34 and 51-56.
IOI. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30000
et seq.
102. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
30233(a)(I )-(8). These "limited" categories include port facilities, coastal-dependent industrial facilities, restoration projects, navigation maintenance, entrances
for boating facilities (and creation of
boating facilities if wetland is already
"degraded"), incidental public services
such as cable and pipeline construction
and maintenance, mineral extraction (except in environmentally sensitive areas),
and nature study, aquaculture, or other
resource-dependent activities.
103. See generally Status and
Trends, supra note I.
104. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 30607. I ( 1992). The Coastal Commission was established by the Coastal Act

of 1976 to regulate conservation and development in the coastal zone. The Commission is empowered to control all development in the coastal zone and maintain coastal access in all areas of the state
except San Francisco Bay (which is
under the independent jurisdiction of the
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission). CAL. PuB. RES.
CODE §§ 30000-30900.
105. Address by Paul Webb, California Coastal Commission Regional Staff,
Wetlands: Critical Land Use and Development Issues in California (CLE International Seminar}, in Los Angeles, California (June 13-14, 1991).
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.; CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 30330.
107. LCP requirements are found in
section 30500 et seq. of the California
Public Resources Code. An LCP includes a land use plan and implementing
ordinances, and must be certified by the
Coastal Commission, whereupon authority to enforce it transfers to the local
government. This authority is subject to
appeal to the Commission. As of January
1992, a little over half of the 125 certifiable local areas in the state had received certification. 13:1 CAL. REG. L.
REP. 112 (Winter 1993).
108. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30500
et seq.
109. Id. at § 30233(a), (c); see also
id. at § 30607.1. The criteria used in
evaluating coastal development activities
are set forth in §§ 30200-30265.
110. The Coastal Act does not define
the term "mitigation." The "common
law" definition of mitigation refers to
"methods of reducing potential damage
or destruction to habitat, and ways to repair, restore, or compensate for damage."
Jon A. Kusler & Hazel Groman, Mitigation: An Introduction, 8(5) NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER (Envtl. L. Inst.) 2
(Sept.-Oct. 1986). This impression of
Coastal Commission mitigation policy is
based on the author's review of a great
many Coastal Commission project approvals in which mitigation requirements
are attached.
11 l. CAL. WATER CODE§ 174 et seq.
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1986).
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1252; CAL. WATER
CODE§ 13160.
114. Water Resources Control
Board, Division of Water Quality, Notice
of Public Review of Proposed Negative
Declaration for the Water Quality Certification of Nationwide Permits Issued by
the U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers Pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act (November 1992).
115. For example, in 1990 the Dis-

California Regulatory Law Reporter• Vol.13, Nos. 2&3 (Spring/Summer 1993)

ney Corporation approached the Coastal
Commission, the Port of Los Angeles,
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
regarding a massive waterfront amusement park in Los Angeles Harbor. The
project was met with a negative response
from Coastal Commission staff and other
resource agencies, and the Disney Corporation was advised that it should not
plan to proceed with the project. Nevertheless, Disney opted to continue with
the project, apparently hoping that political influence would save the day. See
11 :3 CAL. REG. L. REP. 164-65 (Summer
1991 ); l l: I CAL. REG. L. REP. 124 (Winter 1991 ). In 199 l, the corporation convinced state Senator Ken Maddy to carry
a bill exempting the project from the
Coastal Act, but strong environmental
group pressure caused Maddy to drop
the bill and Disney to abandon the proposal in December 1991. 12:1 CAL. REG.
L. REP. 158 (Winter 1992); 11 :4 CAL.
REG. L. REP. 174 (Fall 1991).
116. "Success" in these projects is
determined by the presence or absence
of the target species-the endangered
Least Bell's Vireo. It is important to note
that while these projects have generally
been accepted as "successful," the criteria for success did not include a measurable, fully functioning ecosystem.
117. For example, a riparian area in
the Mission Trails Regional Park area
east of San Diego was revegetated with
willows and other native species to compensate for nearby roadwork; these species established themselves rapidly and
appeared similar in value to surrounding
habitat. However, biologists working on
the project noted that the same or similar
species probably would have revegetated
the site naturally almost as quickly. The
net effect of the project therefore appears
to be acceleration of revegetation rather
than increasing habitat values.
118. Even where part of the habitat
has been "restored" or "enhanced," the
net effect is decline in total wetland habitat. See Mitigation Problems, supra note
2, at 33. Therein, biologist Zedler noted
that "the assumption behind many mitigation projects is that native species can
be concentrated in smaller areas by manipulating the habitat. This might be true
for humans, but not for wildlife." By attempting to crowd native populations
into smaller and smaller areas ("high-rise
wetlands"), long-term persistence of
these species often fails.
119. Determining the Need, supra
note 53, at 11.
120. This problem is not unique to
mitigation projects in California or even
in the United States. In Great Britain, the
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feasibility of ecosystem creation has
been questioned as often exacerbating
problems rather than increasing resource
values. See William Sutherland & Chris
Gibson, Habitats to Order: Man Made
Habitats Are No Substitute for the Real
Thing, I 17 NEW SCIENTIST 70 ( 1988)
(hereinafter "Habitats to Order").
121. See generally Pacific Estuarine
Research Laboratory, A Manual for Assessing Restored and Natural Coastal
Wetlands With Examples From Southern
California (San Diego State University
Biology Department 1990); I & 2 WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE
STATUS OF THE SCIENCE (Jon A. Kusler &
Mary E. Kentula eds. 1989) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPN600/389/038).
122. Id.
123. Jon A. Kusler & Hazel Groman, Mitigation: An Introduction, 8(5)
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1986).
124. This analogy was first stated in
Habitats to Order, supra note 120.
125. See supra text accompanying
notes 51-56.
126. A mitigation bank differs from
a mitigation project in that it is designed
to compensate for habitat losses resulting
from one or more development projects,
not just one. Theoretically, a mitigation
bank is always established in advance of
the impacts that will result from the development project. Elizabeth P. Riddle,
Mitigation Banks: Unmitigated Disaster
or Sound Investment? 3( I) CAL. WATERFRONT AGE (Cal. Coastal Conservancy)
37 (1987) (hereinafter "Mitigation Banks").
127. USFWS is generally considered
the primary authority on assessing impacts to sensitive habitat areas. It is the
only federal agency that has published
guidelines for both mitigation (see supra
text accompanying notes 51-56) and
mitigation banking (see infra text accompanying notes 149-53). See also
MITIGATION BANKING, supra note 43.
128. FWS Mitigation Policy, supra
note 51. See also MITIGATION BANKING,
supra note 43, at I.
129. See Diane M. Niedzialkowski
& John A. Jaksch, Wetlands Mitigation
Banking as an Innovative Approach to
Wetlands Regulation in FRESHWATER
WETLANDS AND WILDLIFE (U.S. Dep't of
Energy, Office of Scientific and Technical Information, Oakridge, Tennessee)
(R.R. Saritz & J.W. Gibbons eds. 1989)
(hereinafter "Wetlands Mitigation Banking").

130. This general scheme has been
used since 1985 when it was introduced
by USFWS biologist David Soileau:
18

A developer undertakes measures to create, restore, or preserve
fish and wildlife habitat in advance
of an anticipated need for mitigation
for project construction impacts. The
benefits attributable to these measures are quantified, and the developer receives mitigation credits from
the appropriate regulatory and/or
planning agencies. These credits are
placed in a mitigation bank account
from which withdrawals can be
made. When the developer proposes
a project involving unavoidable
losses of fish and wildlife resources,
the losses (debits) are quantified
using the method that was used to
determine the credits, and a withdrawal equal to that amount is deducted (debited) from the bank. This
can be repeated as long as mitigation
credits remain available in the bank.
David M. Soileau, Jim D. Brown &
David W. Fruge, Mitigation Banking: A
Mechanism for Compensating Unavoidable Fish and Wildlife Habitat Losses,
50 TRANS. N.AM. WILDL. NAT. RES.
CONF. 465-74 (1985).
131. Mitigation Banks, supra note
126, at 38.
132. Telephone interview with Robert Radovich, Associate Fisheries Biologist, California Department of Fish and
Game (Apr. 28, 1992).
133. Mitigation Banks, supra note
126, at 4.
134. Id.
135. MITIGATION BANKING, supra
note 43, at 11.
136. Id. at 11-12.
137. In fact, no single habitat evaluation system has been demonstrated to
be successful in reliably measuring habitat values. Id. at 14.
138. For a critical analysis of the
HEP procedure in coastal habitats, see
David A. Nelson, Use of Habitat Evaluation Procedures in Estuarine and
Coastal Marine Habitats (U.S. Dep't of
the Army E.L.-87-7, Wateiways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi
1987).
139. For example, in the Batiquitos
Lagoon enhancement project in San
Diego County, the HEP analysis contained a list of 30 target species of animals which were to be compared in a
before-and-after analysis. The area impacted by the project was a subtidal embayment area in Los Angeles Harbor
which was inhabited by nearshore fish
species and nearshore bird species such
as seagulls. The proposed mitigation site,
Batiquitos Lagoon, is a shallow semitidal brackish lagoon which provides

largely shallow water, mudflat, and wetland habitat for shore birds, marsh birds,
insects, and waterfowl. The indicator
species in the HEP analysis consisted of
28 species of fish and two groups of
birds (seagulls and diving ducks). The
effect of choosing these 30 types of animals was to ensure that the habitat lost
in Los Angeles Harbor would be evaluated for replacement, but it ignored the
existing habitat value of the lagoon. As
a result, significant habitat loss would go
unnoticed.
140. See, e.g., MEC Analytical Systems, Inc., Evaluation of Habitats: Section 9, Revised Batiquitos Lagoon Enhancement Project (1990). A modified
version of the HEP analysis, combined
with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers'
ratio to references (RTR) technique, was
used, after the original HEP analysis was
abandoned as inadequate. The Metropolitan Water District in Southern California
has also recently developed a new
method for use in a proposed mitigation
bank involving impacts from reservoir
construction. See Deborah Drezner,
Diane Concannon & Jud Monroe, Mitigation Banking: A Quantitative and Ecological Approach to Regional Site Selection and Habitat Quality Assessment,
presented to the Association of Environmental Professionals Annual Meeting,
San Diego, California (Apr. 24-26,
1992).
141. The advantage of keeping land
in private ownership for maintaining a
local property tax base is somewhat tempered by state laws providing for special
reduced tax assessments for properties
subject to conservation easements and
other wildlife protection agreements. See
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 422, 423.3,
423.7.
142. This is the pattern preferred by
the California Department of Fish and
Game; see infra text accompanying note
184.
143. Monitoring and maintenance
differ slightly from value assessment in
that a monitoring and maintenance program is specific in the field procedures
for collecting data regarding all aspects
of the restored ecosystem (these include
surveys of bird and animal use, soil processing, vegetation, and other physical
factors in the environment). By contrast,
value assessment is the assimilation of
the information collected in a monitoring
and maintenance program and a deduction from that information the degree of
success (i.e., the analysis and mathematical modeling of those data).
144. The "filtering" process occurs
in the sequential application of mitiga-
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tion goals; see supra text accompanying
note 34.
145. This includes the requirement
that the development project must have
no practicable alternative location or
construction methods that would have
less adverse consequences on the wetlands system while still accomplishing
the project objectives. In the early 1980s,
mitigation project proponents often tried
to define their project so narrowly that
there could be no alternative site or design. See GAO REPORT, supra note 71, at
26. The USFWS and EPA no longer tolerate these strained definitions of "project objectives."
146. Some development interests
have encouraged the relaxation of this
requirement when large-scale restoration
projects are proposed. This request has
met with an emphatic denial from the
resource agencies.
147. MITIGATION BANKING, supra
note 43, at 8.
148. Wetlands Mitigation Banking,
supra note 129, at 1089.
149. Rolf J. Wallenstrom, Acting Associate Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service Interim Guidance on Mitigation
Banking (ES Instruction Memorandum
No. 80, June 23, 1983) (hereinafter
"USFWS Interim Guidance").
150. Id.
151. Id. See also MITIGATION BANKING, supra note 43, at 8-9.
152. The points which must be addressed in a mitigation banking proposal
include the following:
• All losses must be unavoidable and
necessary.
• All onsite mitigation alternatives
must be pursued first.
• Property must be available and susceptible to mitigation banking requirements. These requirements include an
evaluation of the ability to acquire the
site by easement, fee title, or other legally binding agreement; ability to manage the property for increased habitat
value; and ability to locate the bank
within the same ecoregion, habitat type,
and state boundary as the impacts being
mitigated.
• In-kind mitigation is required for
Resource Category 2 and is the first priority for Categories 3 and 4.
• Simple purchase of habitat is not
mitigation banking unless "loss avoidance" can be unquestionably demonstrated. The extant habitat value of the
mitigation site will not be considered a
bank credit.
• Consideration should be given to
establishing an interagency team to evaluate sites and select suitable candidate

sites for the specific types of mitigation
required. While developers may be considered as team members, they should
not be in the position of having veto
power or final approval of bank procedures.
• The interagency team could also
"manage" the established bank by approving "credits" and "withdrawals." If
the team approach is not used, it is suggested that a third party (such as an organization primarily interested in public
trust properties) be used as the "banker."
• In no case will financial contributions to a trust fund for future land acquisition and management be considered
as a mitigation bank.
• Means for long-term operation and
maintenance shall be agreed upon before
any area, facility, or improvement is accepted as a mitigation bank. For an action to be considered as a mitigation
bank or bank "component," there must
be agreement among all parties involved
that the action increases habitat value in
excess of the value occurring naturally
during the life of the bank.
• Areas managed or authorized to be
managed by USFWS shall not be considered susceptible to mitigation banking
without specific approval by the Director.
USFWS Interim Guidance, supra
note 149, at 3-4.
153. MITIGATION BANKING, supra
note 43, at 39-94.
154. Michael L. Davis & Gregory E.
Peck, Wetlands Mitigation Banking (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Wetlands Protection 1991) (policy
paper submitted to National Wetlands
Policy Forum) (hereinafter "EPA Policy
Paper").
155. Id. at 2.
156. Uplands are areas of dry land
adjacent to wetland areas.
157. Developers will often offer to
donate and/or dedicate property to be
preserved as natural habitat in exchange
for the destruction of nearby wetland
habitat. EPA and USFWS discourage this
type of exchange because, while it offers
increased protection for some wetlands,
it necessarily results in a net loss of wetland habitat.
158. EPA Policy Paper, supra note
154, at 2.
159. The rationale for this conservative approach stems from concern over
the following factors: potential misuse of
compensatory mitigation to "buy down"
environmental impacts of one alternative
when another less damaging alternative
exists; the technical uncertainties associated with creating and restoring wet-
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lands; potential misunderstandings when
applicants construe or anticipate the establishment of a bank as implying ultimate authorization of specific projects;
the adequacy of habitat evaluation techniques; administrative burdens of establishing a bank on the agency; the legal
complexities associated with implementing a banking agreement; and the need
for long-term monitoring and maintenance requirements. Id. at 2.
160. These prerequisites, see id. at 3,
are similar to those established by
USFWS in its Interim Guidance; see
supra note 152.
161. Service Opinion Letter from
Nancy Forster, Director, Office of Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service, to Suzanne E. Schwartz,
Director, Regulatory Activities Division,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(1991).
162. Id. NMFS also notes that staffing and funding of federal programs is
insufficient to carry out protracted habitat evaluation procedures, which may
preclude attainment of no net loss goals
in the near future.
163. NMFS views money in lieu of
compensation or restoration of habitat as
a valuable method to augment budgets
for expensive programs which otherwise
might go unfunded, such as anadromous
fish restoration. Id.
164. See, e.g., Wetlands Bank May
Not Mitigate Later Damage, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Sept. 5, 1985, at 19.
165. See, e.g., Wetlands: Bush Defends New Policy Against Critics, AM.
POL. NETWORK GREENWIRE, Aug. 12,
1991.
166. Id.
167. SPORTS AAELD, Oct. 1988, at
15.
168. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
169. California Department of Fish
and Game, Guidelines for the Establishment of Wetland Mitigation Banks ( 1991)
at 3 (hereinafter "DFG Guidelines").
170. Id. at 2.
171. Id.
172. DFG Policy, supra note 97.
This policy is separate from the DFG
Guidelines on Mitigation Banking; however, the two policies are largely consistent with each other regarding management issues.
173. This policy prohibits the conversion of one wetland habitat type to
another under the guise of mitigation of
impacts from development elsewhere;
however, this policy is not always followed. See, e.g., note 139 regarding the
19
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Batiquitos Lagoon Enhancement Project,
in which wetland habitat will be partially
used to mitigate for lost subtidal habitat.
174. It is noteworthy that the DFG
Guidelines do not require that the mitigated habitat be functionally equivalent
to the wetland being lost; rather, the mitigated are need only assume the likeness
of a wetland.
175. DFG Guidelines, supra note
169, at 2-3.
176. Id. at 4. The federal guidelines
do not elaborate on the meaning of "mitigation credits." This definition appears
to discount existing wetland habitat
value because it does not require a deduction for possible wetland habitats that
are lost in the creation of the mitigation
bank.
I 77. Id. at 5. It is unclear exactly
how the 40-mile limit was established,
or what relevance it has to the ability to
create in-kind compensation.
178. Id. This requirement is particularly puzzling, because most wetland
species are at least partially dependent
upon adjacent upland areas. Therefore,
the upland habitat immediately adjacent
to a wetland area is necessarily valuable
to wildlife. This policy and the premise
that all wetland mitigation banks must be
created from uplands are contradictory.
179. However, many mitigation projects use "buffer zones" for bike paths
and other uses which severely disturb
bird use.
180. DFG Guidelines, supra note
169, at 6.
181. Such special circumstances
may be approved only after review by
the affected DFG regional office, DFG's
Environmental Services Division, and
DFG's Wildlife Management Division.
182. DFG Guidelines, supra note
169, at 6. Despite the policy to create
large banks, some of the first California
banks were less than ten acres. See, e.g.,
MITIGATION BANKING, supra note 43, at
46 (summary of Bracut Wetland Mitigation Marsh Bank).
183. DFG Guidelines, supra note
169, at 7. This statement is wholly unrealistic in that there is ample authority
to show that even with a one-to-one mitigation ratio, lost habitat acreage and lost
habitat values will result from project
impacts. This clause will undoubtedly result in heavy lobbying of the DFG Director to approve banks with a one-toone mitigation ratio prior to the establishment of the wetland habitat.
184. However, this requirement ignores the ephemeral nature of many wetland areas in California. A permanent
and constant source of water in many
20

wetland areas would change their natural
state. DFG should require further research in this area and qualify this language such that the timing of seasonal
flows is added to the Guidelines.
185. DFG Guidelines, supra note
169, at 3. See, e.g., note 139 regarding
the Batiquitos Lagoon Enhancement
Project.
186. Mark Fonseca, Regional Analysis of the Creation and Restoration of
Seagrass Systems, I WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE STATUS
OF THE SCIENCE 175 (Jon A. Kuster &
Mary E. Kentula eds. 1989) (U.S. Environmental
Protection
Agency
EPA/600/3-89/038).
187. DFG Guidelines, supra note
169, at 3.
188. These include instances where
impacts cannot be mitigated onsite yet
are so small that offsite mitigation is unlikely to be required.
189. MITIGATION BANKING, supra
note 43, at 2; see also Wetlands Mitigation Banking, supra note 129, at 1095.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. The mitigation-in-advance policy is a far different situation from historic (and some current state) mitigation
requirements, which were generally imposed by permit agencies and occurred
concurrently with impacts, and sometimes subsequent to impacts. Because
wetland restoration and creation projects
often take several years to become fully
functioning (if they ever do), there can
be a considerable period of time during
which habitat has been lost and the habitat is dysfunctional; these temporal
losses are often not considered in mitigation requirements. See MITIGATION
BANKING, supra note 43, at 6.
193. DFG Guidelines, supra note
169, at 3.
194. For example, homebuilders associations and construction coalitions
may pool their funds to locate and purchase property which may then be restored for mitigation credit. In the Chicago area, the Lake County Home Builders Association and the Greater Chicago
Home Builders Association have invested over $40,000 to fund a site selection study as the first step in creating a
wetland mitigation bank. Wetlands: A
Swamp of Uncertainty, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
25, 1991 (Real Estate) at I.
195. Draft EIR/EIS, supra note 5.
196. MITIGATION BANKING, supra
note 43,. at 4.
197. A weak link in the section 404
permit process is noncompliance with
mitigation requirements and lack of

agency resources to monitor and evaluate mitigation actions. Id. This problem
is also prevalent at the state regulatory
level. For example, the California
Coastal Commission staff had only one
enforcement position in 1991 to ensure
compliance with mitigation requirements
pursuant to the Coastal Act. 11 :2 CAL.
REG. L. REP. 153 (Spring 1991).
198. Alternatively, a major complaint within the development industry is
that mitigation requirements are already
too expensive. The addition of a premium (10%), while extremely attractive,
may serve the additional function of deterring plans to develop the wetland
resource.
199. MITIGATION BANKING, supra
note 43, at 2. The science of habitat restoration also benefits. By requiring evaluation of mitigation efforts in advance
of the impacts, banking creates an incentive to refine restoration techniques and
increase the probability for success.
Where there is a required threshold for
success, the enterprise is only lucrative
if it is successful. Thus, the science of
wetland restoration and creation should
benefit from renewed efforts in research
and development.
200. Mitigation Banks, supra note
126, at 3.
201. Id.
202. See generally I & 2 WETLAND
CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE (Jon A. Kuster &
Mary E. Kentula eds. 1989) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPA/600/389/038).
203. Id. The reasons for partial or
total failures differ; however, common
problems include lack of basic scientific
knowledge, inadequate design, lack of
staff expertise and project supervision,
invasion by exotic species, improper site
conditions (e.g., hydrology, wave action,
substrate, nutrient concentration, light
availability, sedimentation rate, improper
grade slopes), grazing by animals, destruction of vegetation or substrate by
catastrophic events, failure of projects to
be carried out as planned, and failure to
protect projects from onsite and offsite
impacts such as off-road vehicles,
groundwater supply pumping, toxics,
etc.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Joy B. Zedler & Milton Weller,
Overview and Future Directions in I
WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION:
THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE 465 (Jon
A. Kusler & Mary E. Kentula eds. 1989)
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPA/600/3-89/038).

California Regulatory Law Reporter• Vol. 13, Nos. 2&3 (Spring/Summer 1993)

FEATURE ARTICLE
207. See, e.g., Corps Issues Permit
for Solid Waste Resources Recovery
Plant, BUSINESS WIRE, May 15, 1989.
See also Port of Long Beach, Protecting
the Environment ( 1991) (promotional
pamphlet).
208. See supra text accompanying
notes 137-40. HEP uses mathematical
modeling to estimate success, and relies
on the assumption that habitat quality
and quantity for selected species can be
numerically expressed. DIVISION OF
ECOLOGY, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, HABITAT EVALUATION PROCEDURES
(1980).
209. HEP analysis limits the number
of species evaluated to about 30. This
limitation becomes a problem, especially
when two types of habitats are being assessed. See supra note 139.
210. See David A. Nelson, Use of

Habitat Evaluation Procedures in Estuarine and Coastal Marine Habitats (U.S.
Dep't of the Army E.L.-87-7, Waterways
Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi 1987).
211. See, e.g., Paul R. Adamus, Ellis
J. Clairain, Jr., R. Daniel Smith & Richard E. Young, II Wetlands Evaluation
Technique Methodology (prepared for
the U.S. Dep't of the Army, Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Dep't of Transportation 1987). More recently, an adaptation of several procedures has been produced. Deborah Drezner, Diane Concannon & Jud Monroe, Mitigation Bank-

ing: A Quantitative and Ecological Approach to Regional Site Selection and
Habitat Quality Assessment, presented to
the Association of Environmental Professionals Annual Meeting, San Diego, California (Apr. 24-26, 1992). This procedure
was accepted for the project for which it
was created; however, it has been rejected
for widespread use by the California Department of Fish and Game.
212. For example, at the Chula Vista
Wildlife Preserve in south San Diego
Bay, two extensive dredge spoil areas
were partially planted with cordgrass to
establish intertidal salt marsh and
mudflat habitat in compensation for the
impacts from the creation of a marina.
The site was monitored with photographs for three years and, by all visual
accounts, the vegetation appeared to
have established a healthy cordgrass
marsh and the marsh was considered a
success. However, in the fourth year,
scale insects infested the cordgrass and
the quality of the habitat rapidly declined. As it turned out, the scale insect
is a common inhabitant of salt marshes,
but is normally kept in check by predatory beetles. This particular "restored"

salt marsh was virtually devoid of the
predatory beetle, which allowed the scale
insect to proliferate uncontrolled. Sampling of the insect community of the salt
marsh as part of the criteria for success
may have alerted project personnel that
there was a problem, and the beetle
could have been introduced to the marsh
to combat the scale insect. Ultimately,
the habitat was identified as a "success"
when in fact it lacks substantial components to the ecosystem.
213. The establishment of a new industry of "restoration corporations" was
envisioned by the Bush administration.
The new restoration corporation will develop a commodity (restored habitat
area) and create a market for it (with mitigation credits sold for profit). This new
industry has already begun to develop.

See, e.g., Wetlands Proposal DisputedBiringer Farm Would Be 'Bank' to Mitigate for Filling Other Sites, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jul. 22, 1991, at E3; From Strawberries to Salt Marsh-Wetlands Bank
Idea Worth Serious Study, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jul. 19, 1991, at AIO.
214. In ecological terms, "disturbance" refers to random and localized
changes to the physical characteristics of
an ecosystem. When kept at a low frequency of occurrence, disturbance actually helps increase biodiversity by providing windows of opportunity for new
species to colonize. However, when disturbance is large-scale, drastic, and/or
chronic, only species which can colonize
and grow quickly can survive. R.E.
RICKLEFS, THE ECONOMY OF NATURE
415-16 (2d ed. 1983). The disturbance
associated with major mitigation projects
includes wholesale manipulation of the
habitat, such as changing the hydrology
of a wetland, disking a road to overturn
the soil, etc., which is potentially harmful enough to limit biodiversity.
215. See, e.g., Habitats to Order,
supra note 120.
216. Id. For an excellent discussion
of this "planet of the weeds" concept, see
David Quammen, Dirty Word, Clean
Place, XVI(8) OUTSIDE MAGAZINE 25
(August 1991).
217. For example, the California
Coastal Act of 1976 is considered to be
"internally balanced" by the Coastal
Commission. Address by Paul Webb,
California Coastal Commission Regional
Staff, Wetlands: Critical Land Use and
Development Issues in California (CLE
International Seminar), in Los Angeles,
California (June 13-14, 1991 ).
218. For example, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers has historically used
a public interest balancing test in section
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404 permit decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 57--61; see also Theodore J. Griswold, Comment, Wetland

Protection Under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act: An Enforcement Paradox, 27: I SAN DIEGO L. REV, 139
( 1990).
219. Letter from Janice GoldmanCarter and J. Scott Feierabend to David
G. Davis, Director, Office of Wetlands
Protection, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Mar. 15, 1991) (regarding
National Wildlife Federation position on
mitigation banking in the section 404
regulatory program).
220. Beveridge & Diamond, P.C.,
Comments on Behalf of the Foundation
for Environmental and Economic Progress, Inc., Concerning Mitigation Banking in the Section 404 Regulatory Program (Jan. 25, 1991) (submitted to Office of Wetlands Protection, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
221. This argument was also stated
by the National Wetlands Coalition in its
Comments on Policy Considerations
With Regard to Mitigation Banking
(Feb. 4, 1991) (submitted to Office of
Wetlands Protection, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency). The Coalition also
argued against requiring projects sited in
wetlands to be "water-dependent." Id.
222. Issues such as the scientific uncertainty of success and the ability to attract some of the species the habitat is
designed to benefit cannot be resolved
in the planning process.
223. Dennis M. King, Avoiding Another Taxpayer Bailout, 14( I) NATL
WETLANDS NEWSLETTER (Envtl. L. Inst.)
11 (1992); see also Mitigation Banks,
supra note 126, at 38.
224. King, Avoiding Another Taxpayer Bailout, 14(1) NATL WETLANDS
NEWSLETTER (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11 (1992).
225. It should be noted that unless
the government recoups administrative
costs from the bank operator, taxpayer
dollars are also used to establish the
bank when the real beneficiary is the private sector interest deriving benefits
from the development. Letter from Janice Goldman-Carter and J. Scott
Feierabend to David G. Davis, Director,
Office of Wetlands Protection, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Mar. 15,
1991) (regarding National Wildlife Federation position on mitigation banking in
the section 404 regulatory program).
226. Most of the sources of knowledge currently used in mitigation techniques stem from controlled university
research which must then be extrapolated to larger, often very difficult, ecosystems.
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227. In any valuation of resources,
if there is uncertainty in the cost of the
resource, the market accounts for this
uncertainty by adding a premium on the
cost of the resource. This premium theoretically incorporates the cost of the uncertainty into the price of the commodity. By analogy, wetland restoration creation projects which are used for mitigation and which incorporate a design that
has considerable uncertainty in it must
incorporate such a premium in the price
of the resource loss commensurate with
the uncertainty. This premium should
then be used to resolve that uncertainty.
The premium can be in the form of additional financial costs, or in the form of
additional dedication of lands for experimental purposes (which thereafter
would be restored).
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